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Abstract 
 Societal pressure to increase security after violent incidents on post-secondary campuses 
such as the Virginia Tech shooting in 2007, combined with the pressure for universities to have 
high recruitment rates, has led to an emerging climate of security on campuses across North 
America. The present study uses Valverde’s (2001; 2008; 2009; 2011a; 2011 b; 2014) security 
projects framework to examine the lived experiences of security measures on a Canadian urban-
integrated campus. Through semi-structured interviews with administrators, campus police 
officers, students, and faculty, and constructivist grounded theorizing, this study provides an in-
depth examination of security from multiple perspectives within one institution. Specifically, the 
study explores how the jurisdiction and logic of security projects have shaped perceptions of 
safety and security on campus. This research demonstrates how differing definitions of campus 
space have resulted in negative perceptions of the legitimacy of campus police. Further, by 
exploring the logic and use of security projects, I uncover how the growing securitization of 
campus is driven by both the desire to provide physical security and the increasing 
corporatization of academia. This study fills a gap in the security studies literature by 
demonstrating a practical application of Valverde’s framework within a Canadian context.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
 I would like to start off my thanking my mother, Maureen Corradi, who was with me 
through every part of the project so instrumentally that she could have written her own thesis by 
now. She has been the recipient of many late-night phone calls and last-minute requests, and 
without her countless hours of editing, brainstorming, and debriefing, this research would not be 
what it is today. I would also like to thank my father, Ben Corradi, for his support and 
contributions as well. Without his determination to help me find a research topic, I may never 
have gotten started. This research is dedicated them. 
Additionally, I owe an immense amount of gratitude to my co-supervisors, Dr. Carrie B. 
Sanders and Dr. James F. Popham. The road to a finished thesis is not always an easy one, and 
with the added time pressure we were under, I know they had to sacrifice a lot to ensure this was 
completed. Their guidance and mentorship has not been confined to this research, as they have 
both provided me countless opportunities for success and growth in many other aspects. Their 
commitment to students and nurturing future academics is unparalleled, and any student would 
be lucky to have them as supervisors alone; I was incredibly grateful to have both of them 
together. I would also like to thank Dr. Philip J. Boyle for his excellent support and 
encouragement as an external examiner. His contributions added depth and conceptual 
enlightenment. Lastly, I would like to thank Nicole Coomber and Claudia Volpe, who were an 
amazing support system throughout this process, and two wonderful friends. They were a 
constant source of encouragement, and while heavily involved in their own theses, always made 
me feel like we would get through it together. And look, we made it!  
 
 
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract………….…………………..………………………………………………....Page ii 
Acknowledgements……………...…….………………………………………………Page iii 
Table of Contents……………………..………………………………………….……Page iv 
List of Figures………………………………………………………………………….Page v 
Chapter One: Introduction……………………………………………………………Page 1 
 Chapter Outline………………………………………………………………….Page 3 
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework…………………….Page 5 
 Introduction……………………………………………………………………...Page 5 
 Security Measures on Campus…………………………………………………..Page 6 
 Campus Police…………………………………………………………………...Page 8 
Private Security and Mass Private Property……..……………………………...Page 9 
 Security Projects Framework……………………………………………………Page 10 
  Logic……………………………………………………………………...Page 11 
  Scope………………………………………………………………….…..Page 13 
  Techniques…………………………………………………………….…..Page 17 
 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………….….Page 18 
Chapter Three: Methodology…………………………………………………….….Page 21 
 Introduction……………………………………………………………………...Page 21 
 Case Study Description………………………………………………………….Page 23 
 Data Collection………………………………………………………………….Page 26 
  Sampling and Recruitment…………………………………………………Page 26 
  Interviewing……………………………………………………………….Page 29 
  Ethics……………………………..……………………………………...Page 31 
 Data Analysis……………….…..………………………………………………Page 32 
  Coding…………………………………………………………………….Page 32 
  Memoing………………………………………………………………………….Page 36 
 Reflections……………………………………………………………………….Page 37 
  Emotionality………………………………………………………………Page 37 
Chapter Four: Space, Jurisdiction and Perceptions of Legitimacy.……………Page 39 
 Introduction…………………………………………………………………….Page 39 
v 
 
 Competing Definitional Understandings of a University Campus……….………Page 42 
Conflicts with the Jurisdictional Model and Perceived Legitimacy of Special Constables Page 45 
Jurisdiction and the Shaping of Other Security Measures……………………..Page 47 
 Contextual and Institutional Factors…………………..………………………..Page 54 
  Limited Resources of the Special Constables………………………………….Page 54 
  Decrease in Municipal Police Presence…………………………...…………..Page 56 
 Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………..………………Page 59 
Chapter Five: Dueling Interests………………………………………………………Page 62 
 Introduction……………………………………………………………………..Page 62 
The Relationship Between Logic and Techniques………………..……………Page 62 
Visible Techniques………………………………………………………………Page 64 
Evaluative Measures…………………..…………………………………….Page 66 
 Invisible Techniques…………………………………………………………….Page 68 
 Duality of Security: Physical Security and Corporatization……………………Page 73 
 Discussion and Conclusion………………………..……………………………Page 81 
Chapter Six: Discussion and Conclusion…………………………………………….Page 85 
 Security Projects Framework………………………..…………………………Page 85 
 Jurisdiction of Campus Police…………………………………………………Page 88 
  Reported Victimization at Post-Secondary Campuses………………………...Page 90 
 Corporatization of Universities………………………………………………..Page 91 
 Limitations and Future Directions……………………………………………..Page 93 
Appendices…………….……..……………………………………………………….Page 96 
References………………..………………………………………………………….Page 109 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 3-1 Axial Coding………………………………………………………………….Page 34 
Figure 3-2 Definition of Threat Axial Code…………...………………………………..Page 34 
Figure 3-3 Concept Map “Space, Jurisdiction and Perceived Legitimacy”………..…Page 35 
1 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
University campuses are synonymous with learning, youth, freedom and expression. 
However in recent times they have also become associated with a series of tragic events, and the 
resultant need for increased security. Keele (2004) argues that crime now characterizes the post-
secondary experience, and that post-Columbine and 9/11, violence on campus has become 
normalized and defining. Infamous shootings at Virginia Tech (Hauser and O’Connor, 2007), 
Northern Arizona University, the University of Texas and many others have endured sensational 
coverage, bringing the topic of securitization of post-secondary campuses throughout North 
America to the forefront of countless minds. Many scholars argue that a new climate of security 
emerged across American and Canadian universities as new measures were implemented to 
make post-secondary institutions preventative instead of reactive (Fox and Savage, 2009; 
Bosselait, 2010; Randazzo and Cameron, 2012).  
The objective of this study was to examine the use and perceived effectiveness of security 
measures on a Canadian university campus. This was accomplished through 18 semi-structured 
interviews with administrators, campus officers and students. In order to advance the state of 
scholarship on campus security, the project adopted a security projects framework (Valverde, 
2001; 2008; 2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2014) to understand the perceptions of safety and security on 
post-secondary campuses. Valverde (2014) defines a security project as “the governing networks 
and mechanisms that claim to be promoting security at all scales” (p. 382). Vital to Valverde’s 
security projects framework is the questioning of the underlying assumptions of a project, which 
are often seen in the lived experiences of that project. 
The present study sought to understand how campus security is experienced by those 
designing security measures, those enforcing them, and the students being protected by them in 
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order to provide a holistic picture of the goals of a security project, and the intended and 
unintended consequences of measures employed to achieve them. The research was organized 
around three primary research questions:  
(i) What are the similarities and differences between students’, campus police 
officers’ and university administrators’ perceptions of safety and security?  
(ii) What are each group’s perceived objectives of the use of security measures and 
what are the intended and unintended consequences of the security projects?  
(iii) How do the findings reflect or not reflect the security projects framework?  
For the purposes of this study, a security ‘measure’ is used similarly to Ericson (2006), as a 
technique or technology used to enforce the dominant security goals of the society or institution 
it is present in. The studied campus is unique in its structure as it is located and integrated 
throughout the downtown neighbourhood of a mid-sized Canadian city. As such, the 
jurisdictional interplay between private (campus police) and public (municipal police) security 
forces was influential to the scope component of the project in this framework.  
Valverde’s framework emphasizes consideration of security policies and the governing 
bodies and institutions in which they take place. It is comprised of three key components; the 
logic of a project, its scope, and the techniques used within it. To address these components, I 
examined the security measures used on campuses and the way security policies are created, 
implemented, and experienced on a Canadian university campus. The lived experiences of 
security measures on post-secondary campuses is a topic that has not been covered in detail, 
especially in Canada (Bosselait, 2010) and rarely from a qualitative perspective. This study, 
therefore, contributes to the literature by providing an in-depth, qualitative application of the 
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security projects framework. To this end, my study will approach the questions of campus 
security and its implications for the community through the following chapters.  
Chapter Outline 
 Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework begins by providing the 
context for this study in light of previous events on university campuses, before moving into a 
description of Valverde’s security projects framework, and reviewing other relevant security 
literature. Literature regarding jurisdictions of campus police, the concept of security theater and 
university branding are also included.  
Chapter Three: Methodology provides an overview of the constructivist grounded theory 
methodology, as well as the justifications for various approaches as informed by previous 
research on security issues on campus (Asumussen and Creswell, 1995; Heinsler, Kleinman and 
Stenross, 1990; Jacobson, 2015). The chapter gives a detailed description of the case study 
before providing information on the processes of data collection and analysis.  
Chapter Four: Space, Jurisdiction and Perceived Legitimacy discusses how definitions 
of campus ‘space’ and the campus police jurisdiction relate to experiences of security on campus 
and the perceived legitimacy of the campus police. This chapter illustrates how these differing 
definitions held by university officials and students affected the relationships between students 
and the campus police, as well as their use of the campus police as a service.  
Chapter Five: Dueling Interests details the use of visible and invisible techniques, and 
how these shed light on the logic, or goals and assumptions, at the studied campus. This chapter 
connects to concepts of corporatization, institutional risk management, security theater and 
university branding in relation to how the university brands itself as a ‘safe’ environment. It also 
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examines what the goals of the university appear to be, and how they may at times compete with 
each other.   
Chapter Six: Discussion and Conclusion provides an analysis of how the findings relate 
to Valverde’s security projects framework, and discusses what contributions this research has 
made to the fields of security studies and research on post-secondary campuses. It concludes by 
offering suggestions for future research in the same fields, and how this study can be built upon 
for further investigations.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
 Acts of violence on post-secondary school campuses have been heavily publicized, 
leading security on post-secondary campuses to become a hotbed issue in the media and in the 
daily lives of those who attend them. School shootings and resulting media coverage have been 
found to create concern about the future potential of their occurrence, and disproportionate 
responses in relation to their frequency (Schildkraut, Elsass, and Stafford, 2015). With extensive 
media coverage of events such as the attack on Jeanne Clery, and the mass shootings at Northern 
Illinois University, Umpqua Community College in Oregon and Virginia Tech, many post-
secondary schools are working to enhance their security practices (Bosselait, 2010; Schildkraut, 
Elsass, and Stafford, 2015). These incidents are important to consider as Crawford and 
Hutchinson (2014) argue that shifts in climates of security may cause what was once considered 
politically indefensible to become readily accepted. For example, the sweeping security measure 
of mass collection of online data may have once been an unthinkable invasion of privacy, but is 
now framed as a necessity (Lyon and Haggerty, 2012). In what follows, I introduce current 
literature about security measures on post-secondary campuses. Next, I review the available 
research on campus police, with particular attention to their jurisdiction and public perception. I 
conclude by providing a detailed description of Valverde’s (2001; 2008; 2009; 2011a; 2011b; 
2014) security projects framework, and discuss how my research contributes to the field of 
security studies. 
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Security Measures on Campuses 
 The landscape of security on university campuses has been significantly influenced by 
two historical acts of violence: the murder of Jeanne Clery at Lehigh University in 1986 (Keels, 
2004; Jennings et al., 2007; Janosik and Gregory, 2003), and the Virginia Tech mass shooting in 
2007 (Fox and Savage, 2009; Randazzo and Cameron, 2012; Bosselait, 2010). In one of the first 
events to have a serious impact on post-secondary campuses, the brutal sexual assault and 
murder of a Lehigh University student named Jeanne Clery led to the enactment of the Clery Act 
(Keels, 2004). The Clery Act is an American federal law which universities and colleges must 
follow by reporting information about their security policies and crimes that occur on campus 
(Clery Act, 1990; Keels, 2004; Jennings et al., 2007; Janosik and Gregory, 2003). This Act 
codified post-secondary institutions’ obligation to report violent incidents, and the right of 
students and parents to know this information to make informed decisions about the perceived 
safety or security of a university campus.  
The security of post-secondary campuses was again subject to the media gaze and 
politicization following the 2007 Virginia Tech shooting, which added a further dramatic change 
in security measures (Fox and Savage, 2009; Randazzo and Cameron, 2012; Bosselait, 2010). 
Randazzo and Cameron (2012), for example, argue that the depth of the tragedy and media 
coverage caused a call for an intensification of security measures on campus to prevent future 
acts of violence. Fox and Savage (2009), in their analysis of twenty American universities’ and 
colleges’ internal reports following the Virginia Tech shooting, found that campuses attempted 
to increase security through the creation of: emergency response plans, mass communication 
systems (see also Bosselait, 2010), multidisciplinary threat response teams, training programs 
around privacy for personnel, connections with local health agencies, practicing emergency 
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plans, and educating all members of campus communities about their roles during an emergency. 
Although many additional measures are in use today, not all recommendations were adopted, 
such as the suggestion that all incoming graduate students should have to go through mental 
health examinations (Fox and Savage, 2009).  
Similarly, Bosselait (2010) found that the University of Pittsburgh, James Madison 
University and the University of South Carolina changed their security policies after the Virginia 
Tech shooting in 2007. For example, she noted the introduction of policies around guns and 
violence, emergency plans, active shooter training, wearing identification in residences, 
communication systems, privacy of students, threat assessments, and mental health.  She also 
found that among post-secondary institutions, the construction of mass communication systems 
was the most common change after the Virginia Tech incident. While many of these changes 
have occurred due to the fear of active shooting events on campus, they affect many other areas 
of campus life such as the lived experience of students (Bosselait, 2010). 
In addition to highly publicized incidents in the United States, Canada has faced its own 
tragedies on post-secondary campuses and their repercussions. On September 13, 2006, a tragic 
shooting took place at Dawson College in the Canadian city of Montreal. One of the 
recommendations that came out of that attack was to pay more attention to the internet usage of 
students who show other warning signs, as the perpetrator left many troubling messages on chat 
rooms and websites that encouraged violent acts (Cohen-Almagor and Haleva-Amir, 2008). 
Howells (2012) surveyed the media coverage of all Canadian school shootings in the previous 
twenty-five years and found that the shooting at École Polytechnique (also known as the 
Montreal Massacre) in 1989 garnered a substantial amount of media attention. However, due to 
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the nature of the attack and the motives of the offender, much of the media attention focused on 
women’s rights (Howells, 2012) as opposed to security issues.  
Examining securitization on campus is especially crucial during or following periods of 
intense media coverage because it is important that recommendations adopted by post-secondary 
campuses are effective and appropriate, instead of knee-jerk reactions. Gregory (2012) argues 
that often universities use the addition of visible, promoted security measures, or perceivable 
‘securitization’ of the campus as a way to extend a narrative of a university as safe.  Many of 
these recommendations are costly, and smaller campuses with less resources may have a hard 
time implementing all of them (Patton and Gregory, 2014). While security measures on 
campuses are important, they are not created or experienced in a ‘bubble’ and the impact of them 
must be addressed in a holistic manner, rather than from only an efficacy, branding, or financial 
perspective.  
Campus Police 
 As campus police are a significant and visible security measure on campus, there has 
been a great deal of scholarly attention paid to them, particularly in the United States. Campus 
police services are regular features on modern university campuses, and the first campus police 
service was established at Yale University in 1894 (Paoline and Sloan 2003; Patten, Alward and 
Thomas, 2016). Campus police officers have varying tasks dependent on their location, and their 
jurisdiction varies as well. At many universities, they have jurisdiction that is limited to property 
owned by the university. However, in the ever-emerging urban university (Horvat and Shaw, 
1999) these boundaries may be unclear (Jacobsen, 1995). Some scholars have noted that any 
discrepancy or over-stepping of jurisdiction by a campus police officer, such as arresting 
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someone on the wrong side of the road (Jacobsen, 1995), could lead to a lawsuit or case 
dismissal (Hopkins and Neff, 2014).  
 Of course, in order for the campus police to respond to calls, reports have to be made. 
Aiello and Lawton (2018) began by questioning how students at universities viewed the 
legitimacy of their respective campus police forces, and how that was related to whether they 
were willing to report crimes to them. They found that these perceptions of legitimacy were 
related to reporting probability, and that many students did not view their campus police as 
legitimate authorities. This perception was often based on previous contacts with the campus 
police, and how the student felt they performed (Aiello and Lawton, 2018). Similarly Wilkinson 
(2016) found that campus police services often used social media to attempt to engage in 
‘legitimation work’ which often manifested in responding to public questioning of their 
authorities, tactics and behaviour (such as officers smoking in non-smoking areas). Furthermore, 
Wada, Patten and Candela (2008) noted that campus police officers are stuck in a liminal state 
between being viewed as a civilian and a perceived legitimate authority. Their training, uniforms 
and positions made them more than a regular staff member at the university, but the officers 
were unable to complete the transition of legitimation that other police officers undertake (Wada 
et al., 2008).  
Private Security and Mass Private Property 
 This thesis also builds on existing international theory and research regarding the use of 
private security services at mass private properties. Beckett and Herbert (2008) have noted that 
large private spaces have proliferated particularly in urban areas such as shopping centres, office 
complexes and gated communities. Many of these spaces are staffed by private security 
companies that are often empowered to enact trespass orders on the property or restrict access 
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from those who may be deemed unwanted. Hutchinson and O’Connor (2005) describe this 
empowerment as occurring through the state legislating private officers in these spaces to have 
rights that often only state employees, such as public police, have. While special constables are a 
unique instance as they are mandated by the public police but operate on private property only, 
they have many of the same powers and face the same challenges as security officers who are 
strictly private. Rigakos and Greener (2000) offer the example of airports as a unique case study 
of the interaction between public and private policing, where some duties of the public police can 
be contracted out to private security firms such as administering parking tickets. Arguably a 
university provides a similarly intricate balance of jurisdiction, particularly in an urban area. The 
urban context is especially important to consider as when these mass private spaces become 
more prominent in the urban landscape, the areas that marginalized or unwelcome citizens can 
access are further threatened and narrowed (Beckett and Herbert, 2008). Later, the urban context 
of the studied university will be described and considered, with the discussion of the urban 
renewal efforts often intertwined with the introduction of mass private properties. 
Security Projects Framework 
Valverde (2001), in her critique of security studies, argues that the various definitions and 
discourses surrounding security are often dominated by those with professional interests in 
security, creating a biased view of solutions. Much of the research on security, she argues, 
focuses on security as a thing – a noun – that renders most analysis of security as defining it as 
either ‘good’ or ‘bad’. Yet she argues that social scientists contribute to the study of security 
more substantively when they focus on security ‘projects’, instead of the concept of security 
itself (2014). She defined these projects as the systems and apparatuses that claim to enhance 
security in various spatial and temporal scales, and may include policies and measures that have 
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been instituted to fill a goal of ‘security’, through visible or non-visible methods (Valverde, 
2014). 
 Valverde (2011b) presents three questions that must be answered to assess a security 
project. First, one must consider the logic of the project, which includes the justifications, 
reasoning, discourse and goals of the project. Second, Valverde proposes questioning the scope 
of the project which is comprised of the temporal and the spatial scale, and the jurisdictions both 
formal and informal, involved in the project. Lastly, the techniques of the projects must be 
examined in terms of their governance and reflexive effects. The techniques often include the 
technologies or implementation of security measures. These three areas will be discussed further 
in the next sections.  
Logic 
 Valverde (2001) introduces security not as a state of existence but rather an idealized 
goal. Framed as an objective, security can then be operationalized beyond practice to include 
techniques, relations and institutions. Valverde’s view of the necessity of questioning the logic of 
security projects draws from Rose and Miller’s (1992) discussion of ‘political rationalities’. They 
define political rationalities as the discernable regularities within political discourses that justify 
and formulate the idealized structures of security. For example, political rationalities are often 
employed to interpret penal populism, where being tough on crime is accepted by politicians and 
their supporters as standard political discourse. The outcomes stemming from these practices, 
such as mandatory minimums and high incarceration rates, are not focused on in the resultant 
popular discourse and thus become idealized. By the same measures, then, using these 
mechanisms to rationalize security projects on campuses must also be questioned. It is important 
to consider whether they were implemented primarily as a means of protecting the institution’s 
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community, or as a response to idealistic constructions of the university campus as a ‘safe haven’ 
(Fisher and Smith, 2009). 
The conflict in the ‘moral justification’ for the measures through which power is exerted, 
is often illustrated in the inconsistencies between different projects with similar goals. Valverde 
(2011b) argues that security projects themselves often display internal inconsistencies, or conflict 
with other existing projects that may have the same aims but differing temporal or spatial 
measures. For example, Valverde (2001) compared the damaging of the physical security and 
wellness of cancer patients in Ontario, who suffered longer waiting lists due to budgetary 
cutbacks, to the budgetary allowances for the maintenance and expansions of conventional 
security projects. While the cutbacks contributed to the sickness and suffering of Canadians, they 
were not considered a threat to the security of Canadians. Valverde (2011b) argued that this 
paradox demonstrates internal inconsistency by juxtaposing the attrition of lives due to 
inadequate funding against the securitization of society, which carries the supposed goals of 
protecting Canadian lives. Temporal and spatial inconsistencies are often unacknowledged by 
dominant security discourses, which Valverde links to political rationalities. The conflict in the 
‘moral justifications’ for the measures through which power is exerted is often illustrated in the 
inconsistencies between different projects with similar goals. Crawford (2014) further notes that 
the expansion of security discourse and the political rationalities inherent within them has 
infiltrated more political arenas than just national, as security is no longer just a matter of the 
nation state.  
Securitization is now present on an institutional governing level, in both the public and 
private realms. In Ontario, the ‘private security’ industry is flourishing, with many contract 
agencies providing services to corporations without regulation or oversight (O’Connor, Lippert, 
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Greenfield and Boyle, 2004).  Private and public institutions, inclusive of corporations and 
universities, are now active in their own securitization through enacting their own protections 
and creating their own definitions of risks. Beck (1992) argues that what is considered a risk is 
often due to ‘reflexive politicization’, where collective thinking about definitions and solutions is 
encouraged. This subjects institutions and the state to arbitrary and reactionary democratic 
processes, themselves influenced by the manufactured uncertainty (Beck, 2009), so that the 
issues that are politically identified as risks become what security measures are focused around. 
On post-secondary campuses, securitization may jeopardize feelings of inclusivity, and the 
openness to criticality or activism that characterize many constructions of the university 
environment. While security measures are not always visible, it is imperative that some of them 
are in order to quell the negative perceptions surrounding the manufactured risk, such as the 
narrative of a secure campus often put forward by universities (Gregory, 2012). For example, the 
widespread implementation of emergency notification systems on university campuses give the 
appearance that universities are more prepared for large-scale incidents that many incoming 
students now fear.  
Scope 
Valverde (2011a) argues that a key component of any security project is its’ scope; 
measured on temporal and spatial scales and through jurisdictional relations. The decisions made 
in these elements of the project can often illuminate where risks were seen, and what 
assumptions were drawn, calling back to the logic of the project. When assessing the temporal 
scale of a security project, Valverde (2011a) proposes that one should consider the techniques in 
use and whether or not they are rigidly associated with security measures. The timing of a 
security project, which influences when their measures are active or visible, provides insight into 
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the nature of threats defined by current political rationalities. For example, the technique of a 
regular nightly patrol security guard at private properties suggests a political rationality founded 
upon 1) an assumption that property crimes will occur in the evening (hence nightly patrols); and 
2) an assumption of continuous and unpredictable threat from burglars (hence the continuous 
deployment of the technique). 
 Other techniques have their temporality defined by how they manifest fluidly depending 
on the situation. These changes might be in response to a threat, exemplified by the 2017 
decision by American airports to ban laptops on in-bound planes from certain countries. 
Homeland Security became aware of a threat that laptops may be used as explosive devices and 
subsequently banned them on flights from countries they deemed most at-risk (Zhang, 2017). 
Again, the temporality of these are indicative of political rationalities: the specific ban suggests 
that threats are understood to come from certain individuals, while the limited timing suggests 
confidence in authorities’ abilities to mitigate this specific risk. Additionally, one should 
examine whether all parts of the project align in temporal terms, or whether conflicts in the 
structures exist that may influence when certain techniques can be used. This may be 
exemplified on campuses through the increased presence of campus and municipal police during 
freshman orientation weeks. Crawford and Hutchinson (2014) find that the temporal scale is 
crucial to all projects and is central to how security is experienced within those projects. 
Temporality can define when measures are being used and when they are not, which has 
implications on what or whom may be perceived as threats. Valverde (2014) also notes that 
temporality is influential on the spatial scale of a project, which in turn also impacts jurisdiction. 
 Valverde (2011a) explains that the spatiality of a security project and its consistency is 
crucial to choosing the security mechanisms or techniques that it will use. The spatial scale of a 
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project can include the planning of land use, exclusionary zoning, or urban planning (Valverde, 
2011a).  To this end, Jennings, Gover and Pudrzynska (2007) relate campus victimization 
reduction strategies to the integration of walkways and parks within the institution. As an 
example, having a park may make a campus appear more student friendly for some projects; for 
others, it provides an area for the congregation of a non-student homeless population. The 
decision to add or incorporate a park could shed light on the perceived risks of that institution. 
Even the location of a campus in an urban or rural area could greatly affect the spatial scale of its 
security measures, as a more centrally contained campus could be a spatial measure in itself. 
Spatiality and temporality, therefore, both influence the types of techniques used in a security 
project such as a post-secondary campus, as do the jurisdictions that often intersect on campuses. 
 The intersection of authorities on campus is important to the third measure of Valverde’s 
(2014) definition of scope, ‘jurisdiction’. Valverde (2014) defines jurisdiction as the ‘governance 
of governance’ (p.155) and ties it to shifts in spatial scale that may be governed by or cause 
conflict along lines separating various actors. For this definition of jurisdiction, it is not only who 
will govern, and what will be governed, but how the subjects will be governed (Valverde, 2014).  
For example, in their study on the use of behavioural threat assessments on campuses, Randazzo 
and Cameron (2012) noted that many Canadian post-secondary institutions do not have campus 
law enforcement and thus may rely on municipal or provincial police assistance – in this manner, 
the jurisdiction of the local police force is expanded into the pseudo-private domain of the 
college or university campus. Exploring how their presence is mandated, and what powers they 
can exercise is vital to understanding their impact. Many criticisms of law enforcement come 
from within universities, and this expansion of their service could create a conflict of having to 
maintain a critical gaze on those tasked with protecting you. 
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Additionally, in a security project framework, the reliance on multiple police departments 
presents jurisdictional issues which are further complicated when a campus has its own officers. 
Campus officers may have their own security measures that may not align with the interests of 
the public police. There could be confusion around jurisdictional boundaries, or a conflict of 
interest. For example, recalling Gregory’s (2012) view on the importance of the safe campus 
narrative, institutions may have a different emphasis on formal reporting of certain acts 
compared to the local police service. Thus, a thorough assessment of how jurisdiction guides and 
influences measures is critical to examining the jurisdictional issues on campuses. Much of the 
research available on security has neglected to analyze legal mechanisms of security projects and 
the influence that jurisdiction has over them (Valverde 2011a). Valverde (2014) argues that 
conflicts most often arise over jurisdiction in territories that are governed by multiple authorities 
and points to urban settings as a prime example.  
It is also important to address the measures that have been used to try and avoid conflict 
by incorporating multiple levels of jurisdiction simultaneously when addressing the conflicts in 
jurisdiction. The need for this in a campus assessment is clear in Randazzo and Cameron’s 
(2011) article. They point to the additional layer of jurisdiction in the authority of upper level 
administration over security measures on campuses rather than just local or campus police. They 
note that threat assessment training extended beyond response teams to include the presidents 
and vice presidents of the schools as well. This occurred so that administrators could properly 
develop policies and practices around the technique; however, there is no guarantee that this will 
avoid conflicts with those not bound by the policies, such as the public police. It is important to 
question the training of administrative personnel in relation to the security measures they 
implement to inform their authority. Jurisdiction, therefore, is important not only to assess who 
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has legitimate authority over a security project, but also from the perspective that who has 
authority often determines how that authority will be used.  
Techniques 
 While the objectives and decision-making processes in security projects are crucial, the 
methods through which they are supposedly achieved are as well. Techniques are the measures 
used in security projects to implement the goals, and thus the logic, of that project (Valverde, 
2001). This assumption is based on Rose and Miller’s (1992) exploration of technologies of 
governance (the strategies, techniques, and procedures designed for program delivery), which 
they argue form the avenues through which political rationalities, and thus the logic of security 
projects, get deployed and implemented. Furthermore, they explain that these technologies are 
mechanisms for connecting authorities’ interests with individual activities, translating idealized 
goals into reality. For example, the use of wide-spread internet surveillance by government 
agencies is founded in the rationality that privacy is overshadowed by the greater need of 
protection from enemies. Who is targeted by this surveillance would shed light on the 
assumptions around who those enemies are, and catching them before they attack could be the 
idealized goal. In terms of techniques, other scholars have pointed to technologies as being 
favoured solutions for politicized security issues over laborious police work (Lyon and Haggerty, 
2012). Referring to the previous example of wide-spread internet surveillance, it is an example of 
a technique that relies on technology rather than man-intensive techniques such as ground 
surveillance by officers.  
Valverde (2001) proposes that due to reflexivity, the most effective techniques are ones 
that build horizontal connections between citizens rather than the top-down approaches favoured 
by the state. An example of a top-down technique is that of surveillance such as the plethora of 
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security cameras in public spaces and the collection of mass amounts of personal data online, 
which Lyon and Haggerty (2012) argue has been a key element of this ‘security era’. State-
sponsored surveillance tactics, such as those undertaken by the US National Security Agency 
(NSA) and exposed by Edward Snowden, were done outside of the law and imposed on citizens 
by the state in the name of ‘security’. Valverde (2011b) argues that surveillance in this manner 
produces a reflexive cycle, where the intensification of security measures leads to more 
innovation by the criminal, in turn leading to more security measures. She describes this as a 
never-ending quarrel between a certain type of security and those who gain from undermining it. 
This continuous spiral is crucial to examine in terms of techniques of security projects because as 
the measures become intensified, there is often a greater risk of the loss of rights of the 
population being governed. Techniques may also be inherently self-reinforcing, as Valverde 
(2011b) exemplifies with risk profiling. She argues that when a group is identified as being of a 
high-risk nature, they will be policed and arrested more frequently, which in turn raises the risk 
score, and results in increased policing and so on until it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Thus, when studying a security project, it is important to examine whether techniques have these 
less visible recursive effects, or what Valverde (2011b) terms “anticipatory reflexive 
governance” (p.8). In a post-secondary campus environment, these effects are best uncovered 
through interviews with those who are being governed, the students, and those implementing the 
governance, the security officers.  
Conclusion  
My examination of security measures at a Canadian post-secondary institution will fill 
multiple gaps in the literature. To date, as described above, much of our knowledge on campus 
security is oriented in the United States. Yet as Bosselait (2010) argues, there is a pressing need 
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for expanded investigations of security measures on campuses outside of the United States in 
order to understand how situational characteristics and reactions may be very different, leading 
to very different findings. If measures are based on only American studies, they may be 
ineffective. Further, due to the infrequency of Canadian campuses with their own campus police 
(Randazzo and Cameron, 2012) they have been largely left out of the literature and it is 
important to acquire a Canadian perspective from the campuses that do employ their own 
officers. Interestingly, Patton and Gregory (2014) found that students at schools in rural 
campuses felt safer than students on urban campuses and noted that this should be expanded on 
further. By examining the lived experiences of students on urban campuses, I am providing an 
understanding of some reasons why this may be the case.   
Additionally, Valverde (2011b) argues that a practical analysis under this framework 
should be dynamic in nature. A dynamic rather than rigid approach would give a more accurate 
picture of governance under the guise of security, and the impacts of its implementation. In her 
2014 article, she suggests that studies into security should no longer focus on security as thing, 
but rather the actual policies and practices that are enacted under its name. By regarding the 
scope, logic, jurisdiction and techniques separately, Valverde (2011b) maintains that the 
assumptions around using particular types of governance for certain problems will become clear. 
Lastly, Crawford and Hutchinson (2014) identify the need to empirically explore the connection 
between Valverde’s ideas and culturally specific experiences of security To this end, Ranasinghe 
(2013) argues that there is a need for an approach that investigates how security is created, by 
what actors and dependent on what values. To address this gap in knowledge, the completed 
study explores students’ perceptions of threat and security measures, as well as the perceptions 
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of those often responsible for its implementation - campus police officers and university 
administrators. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter describes the methods used to conduct this research project. It begins by 
explaining the research questions, before describing the case study location. As the university 
has been anonymized, this section contains relevant information to provide necessary context. 
Next, I explain how I chose my location, and what steps were necessary in order to gain access to 
participants. Subsequently, I detail my methods of data collection such as recruitment and 
interviewing, and finally I describe the data analysis procedure before finishing with a few final 
reflections on the process.  
My original research questions were chosen to broadly reflect the type of information I 
wanted to gather, and to provide a focus for the semi-structured interview guides that I created. 
The questions were as follows: 
1) What are the similarities and differences between students’, faculty’s, campus security 
officers’ and university administrators’ definition and perceptions of security?  
2) What are the perceived objectives of the use of security measures, and what are the 
intended and unintended consequences of the security projects? 
3) How do the findings reflect or not reflect the security projects framework? 
Qualitative methods are best suited these research questions, as they provide open-ended 
questions and the ability to probe for more information, uncovering the intricate connections 
between experiences. For example, in other methods, concepts such as ‘security’ or ‘campus’ 
would have been pre-defined. However, with in-depth interviewing I was able to have 
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participants explain how they defined those concepts, and observe the gaps or similarities 
between them. 
To address the creation of security polices, I interviewed the administrators at a Canadian 
university campus who are responsible for shaping, designing and initiating policies. I also 
interviewed campus police officers, (called ‘special constables’ at this institution), who are 
responsible for the implementation of security policies and measures across the campus. 
Interviewing officers was important to assess the way in which they interpret and implement the 
security policies that they are responsible for (Heinsler et al., 1990). I inquired about their 
training, their jurisdictions, their opportunities for input or feedback, and their use of, or 
experience with, specific measures. These groups (i.e., students, administrators, faculty and 
special constables) were chosen to explore the varying perspectives of those at different stages in 
the cycle of security policy: creation, implementation, and experience. The host university was 
given the pseudonym CANUN, with the studied campus being noted as CANUN2. All of the 
interviews were in reference to CANUN2 only, and while several participants had experience 
with multiple campuses, only their information about the studied campus was requested and 
explored.  
The selection of CANUN2 as the case study site was made for two principal reasons. 
First, the intention was to study an urban-integrated campus, rather than the traditional campus 
setting. Many studies on campus security often take place on more standardized, “closed” 
campuses (Cresset, Benedict and Macdonald, 1996; Bosselait, 2010; Jennings, 2007), and by 
researching an urban-integrated campus, a contribution could be provided to the field of security 
studies (Horvat, and Shaw, 1999). The unique demographic challenges (such as socio-economic 
status and crime rate) faced by the city have made the study of its security policies more relevant. 
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This importance is evidenced by Volkwein, Szelest & Lizotte (1995) who found that while crime 
rates on university campuses are generally much lower than the national average, students are 
more likely to be victimized in the communities surrounding their campuses. For urban campus 
students, their campus is directly integrated into those communities. Additionally, the application 
of the security projects framework (Valverde, 2001; 2008; 2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2014) to an 
urban campus setting appeared to be a unique way to explore its elements of jurisdiction, and 
spatial and temporal scope. Second, the campus is a satellite campus of a larger university, but 
maintains its own individual identity and programming thereby providing the opportunity to 
explore how a university navigates the creation of security policies for an individual campus, 
while addressing standards and consistency across a university.  
Case Study Description 
CANUN is a larger Canadian university with approximately 20,000 students. It has 4 
campuses, with eighty percent of students attending the main campus (CANUN1), and the 
majority of the remaining twenty percent attending the studied campus (CANUN2). The main 
campus contains the features of a closed campus (Cresset, Benedict and Macdonald, 1996; 
Bosselait, 2010; Jennings, 2007), such as a large area designated as campus property where most 
of the university buildings are housed and their campus security service having jurisdiction over 
that complete area. Conversely, CANUN2 is an urban campus, with buildings integrated into a 
populated, urban area (Horvat and Shaw, 1999). There are some similar security measures on 
both campuses, such as the presence of security cameras, the use of a student-run system that 
provides students with people to walk them home at night if needed, an emergency notification 
system, and emergency response plans particular to each campus. While CANUN1 has a system 
of emergency poles spread throughout the campus that directly connect to the campus police, 
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CANUN2 only has one such pole. One dispatch unit is used for both campus police services, and 
is housed at CANUN1. According to university administration, CANUN itself has around 700 
security cameras, 250 of which are located at CANUN2.  
CANUN2’s ‘urban campus’ consists of approximately 20 buildings spread throughout the 
downtown area, with local businesses and city property in between. Walking from the two 
farthest university owned buildings takes less than 10 minutes. City2 is a medium sized urban 
centre with a population of roughly 100,000 and has six larger urban areas within a one hour 
drive. Sixteen percent of its residents are on the low-income index, (Statistics Canada, 2016) and 
in the downtown core more than thirty percent of residents live below the poverty level 
(Statistics Canada, 2011). Eighty-seven percent of residents list English as their first language, 
and the city has one of the highest rates of hospitalization due to opiate overdoses in the country 
(Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2017). The university has been in the city for around 
25 years and while growth has been relatively slow, it is often the location for new and emerging 
programs and contains many of the same services offered on the main campus. In recent years, 
the downtown area has experienced rapid gentrification from the influx of students both as 
buildings get purchased by the university, and as students become the main occupants of rental 
properties. This change has resulted in what participants often described as a palpable tension 
between the students and the local community members who frequent the downtown area. 
Lastly, City2 repeatedly ranks quite high on the Canadian Crime Severity Index, especially in 
relation to other cities in its home province.   
City2 was chosen for the introduction of the studied campus for many reasons, one of 
which was an effort to engage in the renewal of an impoverished urban area. Mass private spaces 
are often introduced into such areas to attempt to spark an influx of economic growth and 
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resultant raising of standards of living (Helms, Atkinson and MacLeod, 2007). Helms et al. 
(2007) term this effort ‘urban renaissance’ and note that developments in infrastructure and 
revitalizing dilapidated buildings are often closely linked with attempts to increase social 
cohesion in urban areas. A university such as CANUN2 is an interesting example of such an 
attempt, as it contains many original city structures that have been renovated and restored. Often 
part of this renewal effort is the attempted reduction in crime or disorder within the surrounding 
areas, particularly when the spaces will garner increased attention as part of the revitalization 
(Boyle and Haggerty, 2011). As Boyle and Haggerty (2011) describe, focusing on an urban areas 
‘livability’ or desirability in general can often mean clamping down on the existence of those 
who are seen as contributing to any ‘undesirability’ in the first place, as noted in their analysis of 
programs introduced in Vancouver ahead of the 2010 Olympic Games. They argue that during 
such endeavors, certain segments of the populations and their wishes are often prioritized over 
those who do not have the same representation, money, or power. Considering the urban renewal 
effort in City2 is important for understanding the town-gown tension described by many 
participants.  
Both campuses have their own units of campus police, who while separate, operate under 
the same university administration. The reason they are separate is that both units also hold a 
mandate from their respective municipal police services. While they are paid by the university, 
the municipal police services provide them with mandatory training such as use-of-force, and 
they report to an inspector at their local police forces. Special constables are different from other 
private security contractors that are common in many provinces in Canada, who are less-
regulated and do not hold the same legal standing (O’Connor et al., 2004).  
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The campus police service only have jurisdiction over university-operated structures; all 
other buildings and spaces are considered to be under the jurisdiction of the municipal police. 
The special constables do not carry guns, but at university buildings they have every other right 
of a police officer. Outside of those buildings, they return to having the same rights as a civilian. 
Decisions around security policies are often made in a hierarchical manner at both campuses. 
Participants generally described the structure as having one main director over both campus 
services, who approves the standard operating procedures officers create before they are 
implemented, and is responsible for gaining approval from university administration when 
needed. They also help to facilitate the introduction of policies created by university 
administration. 
The unique campus structure of CANUN2, and the social and economic context of the 
city it is situated in, has created numerous potential challenges to security policies and 
implementation that may not be present at ‘closed’ or rural campuses. Additionally, its status as a 
satellite campus rather than the main campus of a university means that policies may be 
implemented that are not initially designed for its campus type. Interviewing administrators who 
have experience with both campuses will help to illuminate any conflicts of this nature, present 
or potential. Security policies are not experienced in a vacuum, and understanding the context in 
which they are created is crucial to understanding potential assumptions and justifications 
throughout. 
Data Collection 
Sampling and Recruitment 
I was solely responsible for identifying and recruiting participants. In total, I interviewed 
eighteen people, for approximately 60 minutes each. Brinkmann and Kvale (2015) posit that 
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fifteen interview subjects is the standard, with a buffer of ten. Due to the limited number of 
administrators and special constables, eighteen interviews allowed for sample saturation. Due to 
the small numbers of special constables and administrators on the CANUN2 campus, I identified 
those people that had the relevant job positions and reached out with a brief description of my 
study and my recruitment letter [Appendix B]. I also contacted administrators via email who 
were housed at CANUN1 that were also responsible for policies or direction on the CANUN2 
campus.  
I began with a purposive sampling framework for recruiting members of each group. This 
is a common method employed in qualitative studies that targets individuals who are most likely 
to provide information pertaining to the research questions (Marshall, 1996), and is particularly 
effective when working within closed sampling frames like those encountered at a post-
secondary institution (Ritchie, Lewis and Elam, 2003). With this framework, I contacted only the 
people whose roles would allow them to have contact with security policies. Unfortunately, I 
encountered significant challenges when attempting to unravel the institution’s bureaucratic 
structure, undermining the effectiveness of a purposive framework. Therefore, I employed a 
snowball sampling structure by asking participants to direct me to other relevant people. 
Snowball sampling has been used by other studies on campuses as it is an effective method when 
conducting research in areas with low numbers of staff (Rabe-Hemp, 2008; Jacobsen, 2015). For 
example, Noy (2008) found that snowball sampling can help researchers gain access to groups 
that are primarily work-related, and still produce valuable information. In fact, he found that this 
type of sampling can produce interactive, dynamic information as participants may direct you 
based on your questions, to someone who has more familiarity with what you are looking for 
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(which is what I experienced, particularly with administrators).  In the end, I conducted five 
interviews (four males and one female) with administrators. 
I encountered various difficulties recruiting special constables for interviews for a 
number of reasons. First, there were some human resources barriers with contact information, 
and the turnover rate at the time of study. Secondly and most importantly, I encountered a lot of 
hesitancy about participation in my study. This hesitancy began with pushback during my 
attempt to gain access to documents to inform my interview questions. Later, when attempting to 
recruit participation, any officers who eventually agreed to participate informed me that they had 
to receive permission from their superiors beforehand. Many others refused, and/or did not 
answer repeated emails, or respond to recruitment materials. I attempted to overcome recruitment 
challenges by explaining that my lines of questioning were non-invasive, and would not reveal 
confidential information.  
I recruited students by placing recruitment posters throughout campus buildings, and in 
sanctioned areas (Appendix C). I also targeted large clubs on campus and had them post my flyer 
on their Facebook page, or attended the meetings in person to give quick presentations about my 
research. I also reached out to places where many students are employed on campus to capture a 
larger prospective audience. These activities recruited several students who acted as catalysts for 
the snowball sampling frame. I interviewed seven female students and one male student. In order 
to reach theoretical saturation, where I was able to capture a thorough variety of experiences, I 
interviewed students in all stages of their undergraduate degree, and across many program 
disciplines. While the sample contains more females than males, the campus population reflects 
this disparity as well. However, many female students also discussed gendered experiences with 
security policies (e.g. feeling less safe walking at night due to their gender) so they may have 
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been more willing to participate for this reason. Many of the students had experience in multiple 
capacities across campus as student employees and volunteers, and therefore had interaction with 
security measures from multiple perspectives. For example, student participants who did not also 
work on campus were often unfamiliar with measures that their working-counterparts were, such 
as panic buttons. To recruit faculty, I learned their email addresses online and sent recruitment 
materials to them, along with a brief description of my research. I was able to interview one male 
faculty member and one female, both of whom are tenured. There is not a large permanent 
faculty population on the campus, and their interviews captured a broad range of experiences.  
Interviewing 
Semi-structured interviews were employed due to their flexible nature. Rather than 
defining a strict question-answer protocol, I framed the interviews as guided conversations. The 
semi-structure framing of the interviews enabled me to probe for more information, while also 
providing an opportunity for participants to expand upon topics they thought were important. 
Semi-structured interviews have been the preferred method of many other studies investigating 
issues of security on campuses (Asumussen and Creswell, 1995; Heinsler, Kleinman and 
Stenross, 1990; Jacobson, 2015), and the use of separate interview guides for each participant 
group allowed me to fully explore their functions, assumptions and definitions. All interviews 
were, wherever possible, digitally voice-recorded with two separate recorders and transcribed 
verbatim. When participants chose to not be recorded, I took detailed notes on the interviews 
while they spoke and related them to each question that I posed.  
I employed a semi-structured interview approach to address these questions, focusing on 
participants’ perceptions of threats on campus as well as their perceptions and experiences of 
security measures. Maxfield and Babbie (2014) argue that semi-structured interviews allow for 
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probing or further questioning of topics that the researcher may not have anticipated. 
Additionally, they note that the limited but present structure allows answers to be comparable for 
purposes of coding and analysis. Semi-structured interviews with students and faculty allowed 
for an in-depth exploration of the participants’ perspectives of their lived experiences of security 
policies in their own words, in ways that other methods do not. For example, administering 
surveys to students would have allowed for more participants, however, in order to construct the 
questions I would have had to impose presupposed beliefs or make assumptions about how they 
define security in the first place. Thus, instead of presupposing definitions, I was able to ask 
participants how they defined terms such as ‘threat’ or ‘security’ and probe about how those 
definitions affected their perceptions of, or experiences with, security policies on campus.   
At their core, the interviews were guided by the research questions provided above. This 
helped to narrow the interviewing process by establishing boundaries to my conversations with 
participants. For example, I asked all three groups of participants “How do you define security 
on campus?” If the participant struggled to understand the meaning, I often probed with 
additions such as “what does security on campus mean to you”, or “what is your definition of 
security on campus as a concept?” Charmaz and Holstein (2014) describe probing as an effective 
interview method because it allows a participant to expand on information that the researcher 
may not have initially considered. I would also ask less direct questions to elicit information 
pertaining to the main research questions, such as inquiring about jurisdictional issues, spatial 
elements of security measures, and temporal stipulations of measures to address parts of the 
security projects framework as reflected in the third research question.  
I also made use of institutional policy documents and guidelines as a mechanism to target 
more specific questions for the administrators group. Lippert and Walby (2014) used a similar 
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practice when interviewing municipal corporate security officers. In some cases, administrators 
used these documents as reference points, and went over their use and importance with me 
during the interviews. They then directed me to outside sources where I could find more 
information on the documents as well. These documents were not systematically analyzed, but 
were instead used to supplement interviews, support information provided by participants, and 
triangulate their experiences.  
Throughout data collection, I continually refined my interviewing strategy to reflect 
newly identified information. This is a common practice in constructivist grounded theory as the 
reshaping of data collection throughout the process focuses the product where the most 
knowledge expansion is possible (Charmaz, 2014). For example, I began by asking students and 
faculty about what they thought of a particular measure called the Behavioural Intervention 
Team (BIT). However, during the interviews it became apparent that many students did not 
know what it was so the question was iteratively revised to ask “have you ever heard of the 
behavioural intervention team?” This allowed me to examine awareness and then probe for 
experiences if they were aware. The interviews guides (Appendix D-F) remained largely 
constant throughout, with the occasional addition or rewording of a question once it became 
apparent that an area needed more attention.  
Ethics 
 I received ethical clearance from the Research Ethics Board at Wilfrid Laurier University 
(REB#5469), before conducting any interviews or recruiting participants. The risk for 
identification of participants in two groups were raised due to the small number of special 
constables and administrators on the studied campus.To address this, I designed a coding 
structure that anonymized participants by replacing their names with an alpha-numeric code, and 
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redacted any names, identifying information, or job titles from interview transcripts. Participants 
are identified by their interview number and group designation. For example, participant A13, is 
an administrator and also participant 13. “A” is used for administrators, “C” for special 
constables, “S” for students and “F” for faculty members. All data was kept on a secure 
password protected computer, and any paper documents (e.g. consent forms [see Appendix A]) 
have been retained in a locked filing cabinet in a locked office. Moreover, participants were 
provided input on the interview location to avoid potential identification. If asked, I refused to 
provide information about which of their colleagues were participating in the study, or what 
information they may have provided.  
 In order to keep the case study university anonymous, I gave them a pseudonym 
(CANUN for Canadian university), and redacted the name of the university while transcribing 
the interviews. I also changed the name of the cities that the university is located in, with the 
main campus’ city noted as “City1” and the studied campus’ city being referred to as “City2” for 
consistency with their CANUN1 and CANUN2 labels. Additionally, I redacted the names of the 
respective municipal police forces, and just identified them as the municipal police service in 
either city. Protecting the identity of the studied university was important to ensure participation 
on behalf of the university, but also to protect the identities of all participants who may be well 
connected to other universities, or fear repercussions should they be identified.  
Data Analysis 
Coding 
All interviews were analyzed thematically from a constructivist grounded theory 
approach (Charmaz, 2014). Using Charmaz’s framework, I began with as few assumptions as 
possible and built codes as themes emerged from the interviews. All data was coded by hand, by 
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the author. While it can sometimes be a hamper to have only one researcher (and thus one 
perspective) collect, transcribe and code data, Charmaz (1997) stresses the importance for a 
researcher, particularly a novice researcher, to fully absorb themselves in their data and study it 
thoroughly.  First, I engaged in ‘line-by-line coding’ of the interview transcripts to find meaning 
in small pieces of information that may be lost when it is taken as part of the whole rather than 
unique information (Charmaz, 1997). As themes became apparent, I organized the data with 
‘focused coding’, where data and codes are grouped thematically (Charmaz, 2014). At this stage, 
I found myself with fifty codes such as “Safety Central to Security”, “Biggest Threats”, 
“Security Cameras”, “Harm Reduction” and “Perceptions of the Special Constables”. I chose 
these codes either based on what I believed broadly described the theme, or from a specific term 
that participants frequently used. An example of this was the code “Free Speech”, which is not 
something I questioned about specifically, but often found participants bringing it up such as 
when a faculty participant noted: “I think there's a lot of things that could be threatening. I think 
right now there's a lot of people who feel fear and threat regarding free speech so I think people 
are fearful and feel threatened by that because they don't know what to say anymore” (F12).  
When other participants referenced free speech as well, it became apparent that it was a relevant 
theme and code.  
From there, I moved into ‘axial coding’ to identify relationships between codes. To 
Charmaz (2014), “axial coding relates categories to subcategories, specifies the properties and 
dimensions of a category, and reassembles the data you have fractured during initial coding to 
give coherence to the emerging analysis” (pg. 147). During the process of axial coding, I took 
my focused codes, and looked for themes or concepts within them that further described the data 
and illustrated connections between them. Many of the codes began looking like a tree, with the 
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original open code as the trunk, and second and third levels of branches extending from there. 
Figure 3-1 shows collections of many of these axial codes, and Figure 3-2 shows the specific 
breakdown of “Definition of Threat”.  
 
Figure 3-1 Axial Coding 
 
Figure 3-2 Definition of Threat Axial Code 
While my original research questions guided the construction of my interview guides, two main 
findings began to become evident, which led me to develop two new research questions to 
further explore these findings. The new research questions were as follows: 
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1) What is the relationship between "campus" and space, and perceptions of efficacy of 
security measures? 
2) To what extent is the theatre of security present in the activities of the campus police 
and in the creation of security measures? 
I re-organized the codes based on the revised research questions. During this process, I noted that 
some codes (such as “Interactions with Locals”), contained data that helped to answer more than 
one research question.  
Once I had refined by research questions and axial coding, I created concept maps to 
visually represent the connections between the codes within those sections. A concept map is a 
visual representation of how themes and codes intersect and relate to each other, pertaining to 
one specific topic. Figure 3-3 is an example of one of the concept maps, created for the chapter 
entitled: “Space, Jurisdiction and Perceptions of Legitimacy”.  
 
Figure 3-3 Concept Map “Space, Jurisdiction and Perceived Legitimacy” 
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Initial coding, focused coding, axial coding and concept mapping were hierarchical in nature, 
and assisted with moving from coding to analytic theorizing. 
Memoing 
I also engaged in analytic memoing by reflecting on the meaning embedded in codes, and 
their relationship to my research questions (Charmaz, 2014). This memoing helped form the 
basis of many of my theoretical insights and allowed me to further reflect on connections and 
gaps between what various groups of participants were saying. Consistent with Charmaz (2014), 
as codes were identified I periodically reassessed previously coded material to ensure consistent 
coding throughout. During the memoing, I also continued to re-evaluate the codes that were 
generated to ensure they were products of the data rather than researcher bias. As my familiarity 
with the case study campus grew, so did the potential for my personal perceptions to be reflected 
in my coding. When I noted incidents that had the potential to affect my impartiality, I memoed 
about the experiences and noted it to remind myself not to draw any conclusions from my own 
experiences, only from the data generated by the participants. An example of this is as follows:  
When I was in the downtown area of (CANUN) today attending an interview with a 
participant, I drove by a [local coffee shop] looking for parking. After the light turned 
green I entered the intersection and noticed two men fighting on the corner directly in front 
of the [local coffee shop], in broad daylight. As I got close, one man attempted to push the 
other man in front of my car. I slammed on my brakes and avoided hitting the man, and 
saw the fight continue in the middle of the street with my rear-view mirror. This is the 
same [local coffee shop] that multiple of my participants mentioned, and is attached to a 
residence. While this incident was jarring, it must be separated from the experiences of my 
participants, and could be the product of chance. 
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Using constructivist grounded theorizing, I returned to the literature to find what else had 
been written on these subjects. I wrote literature reviews to illustrate the relationships to my 
findings, and demonstrate the gap that my research filled.  
Reflections 
Emotionality 
 In constructivist grounded theory, reflecting on emotional experiences that may affect the 
researcher is important to maintaining as much impartiality as possible, while acknowledging 
that research is not conducted in a vacuum (Charmaz, 2014). There were two main areas that the 
emotionality of participants and of the researcher were notable. First, the difficulty obtaining 
participation from the special constables was a large source of frustration and worry. While 
challenges with recruitment of participants from policing services is not uncommon, the 
centrality of their input to the nature of the research and the need for the inclusion of their 
experience to conduct a balanced examination made their reluctance concerning. Fortunately, the 
institution itself was willing to cooperate, which is not always the case in research on similar 
issues at universities (Cresset et al., 1996).  During one particular interview an administrator 
referred to some questions as best answered by the special constables, and repeatedly asked 
whether they were cooperating with me. I responded by telling him that I was unable to share 
information given or not given by participants, but by this time I was quite worried that the 
failure to include campus police officers in my research would be a large detriment to the overall 
quality of my work, or even worse, make the analysis appear biased. 
 Lastly, in one of my interviews a student participant disclosed that they were sexually 
assaulted by another student, in the very building that we were conducting the interview. As I 
had been the one to pick the interview location, I was extremely concerned that I had forced her 
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to endure a painful trauma by returning. She informed me that she had chosen to continue with 
the interview in this building because she did not want it to stop her from attending classes or 
events that may also take place there. She was understandably very emotional throughout the 
interview and apologized frequently for crying, and I was struck by the inability to console her in 
a meaningful way. I also struggled to express the fact that I found her emotional response 
nothing to apologize for and that if anything her continued strength to not only reach out to 
participate in the study but to talk openly about such an agonizing topic was admirable. I 
inquired multiple times as to whether she would like to take a break or stop, unsure if I was 
engaging in revictimization with my questions. After conducting the interview, I connected her 
with campus resources. I also reached out to my supervisors for guidance and oversight on my 
decision making. They had no objections to what had taken place, but the ability to debrief and 
have the support of much more experienced interviewers was crucial. Additionally, the 
participant had detailed many obstacles and difficulties that she faced throughout her process, 
and it was challenging to not be angry on her behalf, and thus biased. Through consultation with 
my supervisors, I was able to focus any potential resentment into the desire to gain more 
information about the problems that she identified so that the research could serve as a tool for 
illuminating possible gaps in security policies and practice.   
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Chapter Four: Space, Jurisdiction and Perceptions of Legitimacy 
Introduction 
Using the methods discussed in the previous section, the first finding of note regarded 
participants’ definitions of space, campus and jurisdiction. In this chapter, a brief overview of the 
literature of these topics will be provided, followed by an explanation of the definitional 
understandings of campus and space, and how that created conflict within the jurisdictional 
model. Additionally, I describe how the context of CANUN2 and its unique institutional factors 
further aggravate the conflict with the jurisdictional model.  
A key component to an institution providing security that protects and governs, is the 
definition of the areas in which it can enforce these provisions. Problems can arise, however, 
when definitional understandings of the space and jurisdictional boundaries differ among those 
who use the space and those who govern it. The jurisdiction of the campus police at CANUN2 is 
confined to campus properties, which is not congruent with the way that students perceive the 
confines of ‘campus’. The resultant negative interactions of this jurisdictional model have 
threatened the students’ perceived legitimacy of the special constables. These interactions are 
aggravated by the local context the campus is situated in, and the implementation of particular 
resources. The urban setting of the campus, paired with the frequency of student/local 
interactions, played a significant role in participants’ discussions about jurisdiction.    
Valverde (2008; 2009; 2014) argues that jurisdiction is not merely who is doing the 
governing, but how they are governing. This includes the capacities for governance, the objects 
included under these capacities and the various ‘modes of governance’, or the way in which they 
are able to exercise their governing power.  For example, Valverde (2009) notes that while a city 
park may have by-law officers who are able to issue tickets and thus have some ‘capacity’ of 
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governance over an area, they are not able to arrest citizens in it as the police are. While they 
both have governing capacities, the way in which they govern differs. Valverde (2009) also 
describes jurisdiction as the “governance of governance” (p. 155).  Relating to the city park 
example, the varying powers held by the police and by-law officers demonstrates the different 
‘modes of governance’ included in their individual capacities. While they both have the capacity 
to govern over an area, the modes of governance or tools at their disposal (e.g. issuing fines 
versus powers of arrest) are different. 
Valverde (2008) also focuses on the role of the “police as a hinge between the two key 
temporalities of governance” (p. 147) due to the fact that they make decisions about how to 
enforce modes of governance that can even have varying scales within their own agencies. This 
means that while multiple parts of their agencies may have the same powers to govern over a 
specific incident simultaneously, there are often certain groups who will be the ones to exercise 
this power based on the nature of the incident (e.g. serious or violent crimes). To illustrate this in 
terms of the current project, the special constables have jurisdiction over the campus area, and 
hold a mandate from the municipal police; however, if a murder were to occur on campus the 
jurisdiction would swing to other officers in the municipal police agency or even incorporate 
another police agency entirely such as provincial or federal police. To this end, Valverde (2008) 
argues that jurisdiction is not only territoriality based. Additionally, with the rise of capitalism 
the proliferation of informal or private jurisdictions, or jurisdictions created by a private 
institution (such as a university) rather than by the state, have now become more common 
(Valverde, 2014). Valverde (2008) also argues that jurisdiction and the enactment of governance 
can be similarly flexible with individual cases, as capacities for governance also include the 
power of discretion; choosing how to respond based on circumstances of the case.  
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The concepts of space (i.e., the social, political and economic context of an area) and 
jurisdiction have been a focus of other scholars in security literature as there are many different 
jurisdictional models across campuses throughout North America. For example, Jacobsen (1995) 
identifies two models: (1) Limited, where jurisdiction is bound by property owned by the 
university, and often differs from the student perception of campus, and (2) University-Precinct, 
where jurisdiction is based on the property owned (i.e., territory) by the university and then 
radiates externally in varying distances to include areas where students often frequent and live.   
CANUN2’s contextual place in an urban area was referenced frequently by participants. 
This is not an exceptional concern for the students to have, as Volkwein et al., (1995) found that 
students are generally much less likely to be victimized on campus grounds than they are in the 
communities and areas around them. Specifically they found that ‘campus’ spaces had rates of 
crime that were much lower than the general crime rate, and lower than the areas outside of these 
spaces. Additionally, they found that the most unsafe students were those that had small student 
populations such as medical schools, and frequently interacted with urban residents. ‘Campus’ 
spaces themselves did not have higher rates of crime, but those smaller institutions had higher 
rates of victimization in the communities around them than other students (Volkwein et al., 
1995). Patton and Gregory (2014) also note that students’ perception of safety in ‘campus’ 
spaces may be affected by the situational context because students in urban areas perceived their 
campuses as less safe than those in rural communities.  
Due to the nature of urban integrated versus ‘closed’ campuses, there is more opportunity 
for contact with the local population. Horvat and Shaw (1999) acknowledged that tension is 
frequent on urban campuses, and has a lot to do with the permeable boundaries of the campus 
compared to the literal walls and gates of closed campuses. These issues are often left for 
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campus police to deal with, and are greatly affected by the jurisdictional model the campus 
police are bound by. In response, the jurisdiction of many campus police services have 
frequently expanded; Peath, Barke and Garcia (2008) note that between 1986-2006 there was an 
increase in campus police forces that have state-wide jurisdiction, and a decrease in forces that 
only have jurisdiction on campus or within 10 miles. They noted that with this addition of 
jurisdictional powers, the number of officers on average has increased thirty-eight percent (Peath 
et al., 2008).  
At CANUN2 it was of critical importance to explore the way the campus was defined by 
administrators, special constables, students and faculty, and the impact of these definitions on 
perspectives about the role of the special constables. Additionally, using in-depth qualitative 
methods allowed me to illuminate the definitions of space and campus as seen across groups, and 
critically examine the connections between these definitions, resource allocation and situational 
context. In the sections that follow, I will discuss the issues of competing definitions of campus, 
jurisdictional boundaries, and campus police resources as experienced at CANUN2.  
Competing Definitional Understandings of a University Campus 
CANUN2’s definition of on-campus is confined specifically to university property, 
which in an urban-integrated campus, is limited to the inside of buildings with the exception of 
one courtyard. As described previously, CANUN2 is an urban-integrated campus in the 
downtown area of a medium sized urban centre that faces economic challenges and a high crime 
rate. The university owns and operates approximately 20 buildings, many of which are used for 
classes, events, residence and office space. These buildings are separated by businesses and city-
owned property, and students walk back and forth between them frequently using city-owned 
sidewalks. This campus design and its mix of private and public space is unique compared to the 
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‘closed’ main campus, where the majority of university facilities are located on a single parcel of 
private land operated by the institution.  The mixed composition of public/private property at 
CANUN2 entails that special constables lose jurisdictional authority the moment a student steps 
outside of a university building. The special constables can respond but have no authority, so 
they feel it is best the police respond instead (A7). Unlike municipal police officers, special 
constables only have police powers within their specific jurisdiction, frustrating their activities in 
CANUN2’s urban-campus setting. One special constable explains: 
So on this street here we have authority at [university building on the corner], we don't at 
[restaurant next to it] or [the business next door], we do at the [campus building across the 
street] and [the campus building next to it] so we're constantly bouncing back and forth 
between our police powers to our civilian powers. So that's always one challenge 
here…but we seem to be doing alright with it (C14). 
Although the special constables are paid employees of the university, their contract and mandate 
is held with the municipal police service. In fact, they report to a police inspector, and work 
closely with the municipal officers. Thus, while the university defines their geographic 
boundaries and creates policies that govern the special constables and their day-to-day tasks at 
the university, the special constables are also beholden to agreements with the municipal police.  
While the university administration and special constables share a definitional 
understanding of ‘campus space’, these definitions differ significantly from how students define 
and perceive campus. As one student explained, “Campus I would define as the space where the 
farthest reaching buildings set a parameter... (S15)” In this way, students often perceived their 
urban-integrated, ‘open’ campus to be more like a ‘closed’ campus – perceiving the areas 
between campus buildings and parking structures as part of the university campus. Such differing 
understandings of what constitutes campus space has led to frustrations over the practice of 
campus security and have negatively affected the perceived legitimacy of the special constables, 
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and student perceptions of security on campus. For example, one student reflected on a time that 
she was harassed and followed by men on a city street. This occurred around the corner from the 
special constables’ street-level office so she ran there for help. No one was in the office, so she 
went to a separate part of the building where a university employee helped her to call the special 
constables’ dispatch centre. Unfortunately, as the incident took place outside she was told that 
there was nothing special constables could do:  
…I was told that in my situation that even though I’m a [CANUN] student, because I 
wasn’t in a [CANUN] building, there wasn’t really much that they could do for me and I 
was like but I’m standing outside of a [CANUN] building right now and I need help. And 
then when I called them I was standing inside of [CANUN] building so right now I’m 
standing inside, the situation took place outside and they’re like but that’s city property. 
And so because the buildings are technically on or surrounded by city property it causes a 
jurisdictional issue so that I think they gotta sort that out because as a [CANUN] student if 
you’re just going to help me in the building, what if I, what if something is happening in a 
building and I escape and I’m good I need to know that you’re going to, that you have my 
back when I’m outside as well. Especially so close I’m literally standing right outside (S3). 
The student’s experience above exemplifies one of the most significant gaps in the 
implementation and experience of this specific security measure. The student originally held the 
belief that being a student of CANUN2 is what qualified her for help by the special constables, 
rather than the reality that restrictions are property dependent: she had to be on university 
property when the incident occurred. Unfortunately for this student, and adding to their 
discontent, they discovered this incongruence in the midst of an emergency.   
The implications of this definitional disconnect result in a vastly different perception of 
the level of security on campus, and the effectiveness of security measures. Notably, those 
participants who characterized the level of security as enough or a high level on what they 
perceived as campus, were almost universally administrators, special constables and at times, the 
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faculty participants. Conversely, the student participants and some faculty members, described 
the security on campus as lacking or stated that they felt insecure on campus. This could be due 
to the differing perceptions of campus, and calls back to the findings of Volkwein et al. (1995) 
that students experience more crime on the areas surrounding campus property than on campus. 
If the students define campus as including the surrounding areas, they are also including those 
victimizations as part of their schema of campus security.  
Conflicts with the Jurisdictional Model and Perceived Legitimacy of Special Constables 
Weakened perceptions of the special constables’ legitimacy appear to be affected by 
negative interactions with students, which are usually the result of the confusion and 
disagreements over the jurisdiction of the special constables and other measures, such as trespass 
orders. The confusion around jurisdiction in many cases has led the special constables to often be 
viewed as illegitimate, and unable or unwilling to help. Such perceptions have resulted in 
students exclusively calling the municipal police for assistance instead of special constables. As 
one student participant explains:  
I know a lot of my friends, they just skip over special constables completely, they’re 
honestly taken as a little bit of a joke on this campus from the people I surround myself 
with. So a lot of people just bypass special constables and go to 911 for anything (S1). 
For other students, this lack of perceived legitimacy can also mean taking matters into their own 
hands. Student participant S8 described a situation where a local community member was 
standing on a downtown sidewalk between multiple campus buildings and behaving in a hostile 
manner. Instead of calling special constables, they decided to physically intimidate him 
themselves:  
He was really looking at us very hostile but we decide you know what honestly they’re [the 
special constables] not going to do anything about it, we don’t even bother at this point 
because they’ve got such a reputation student amongst the student body that they don’t do 
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anything. We walked into a restaurant we sat down only to have our other friends tell us 
that that same man was spitting on students as they were walking by and then you know so 
we got really mad and we wanted to fight him but we decided that it would be best to just 
leave it be. We walk up behind him, we say is this the guy? We look at him, gave him a 
good scare and he looks at us all scared and we don’t really do anything…just because we 
know that special constables won’t do anything about it (S8).  
Student participant (S1) actually described being spit on by the same man and opting to call 
special constables about it, only to have her call unanswered four times. Eventually she chose to 
walk past the man again, who was still spitting on people, in order to reach the special constables 
building. She was able to talk to someone there who said they would go check it out but she was 
unsure about what happened to him after.  
While negative interactions with the local community appear to be a source of tension, the 
multiple definitions and understandings of campus space have also created frustrations among 
students regarding when special constables will help and when they will not. For example, at 
times as described above, students would be told they could not be helped by special constables, 
while at other times, students would see campus security assisting others (both members of the 
university and members of the local community) in areas outside their jurisdiction. This 
confusion is significant because while the special constables responded in that case, many 
participants interviewed did not have the same experience. In one case a student-employee 
struggled with understanding administrators’ definition of campus space compared to her own 
perception:  
There’s been like a couple times where at [the park outside her campus office building] 
there was a fight going on between locals and it was like 10 minutes before we had a 
campus tour so I called special constables saying ‘hey right across the street from me 
there’s a fight and families are standing right outside watching, can you just go and deal 
with it?’ And they said ‘no we can’t it’s not our property, it’s not our territory.’ So it’s not 
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even…they’re supposed to be there for campus safety and I would say [the park] is kind of 
a part of the campus but also the town’s. It’s like I am so confused of when it’s a special 
constables thing and when it’s a 911 thing. (S1).  
The students’ experiences illustrate the importance jurisdiction plays in perceptions and 
experiences of security. For these students, their understanding of campus security led to 
negative perceptions and experiences of the university security projects – especially the work of 
the special constables.  
While students found that the geographic boundaries of campus impacted their experiences 
of security practices, they also found the process for contacting special constables and municipal 
services equally as confusing. In cases where special constables dispatch is called first but it is a 
matter for the municipal police, special constable participant C5 described the official process as 
being that the special constables should take over from there and contact the municipal police. 
However, students’ experiences paint a different picture: 
We’re told to utilize campus partners so apparently special constables is supposed to be 
like the first call and then there’s been a couple times that they’ve been like ‘no call 911’. 
It’s kind of like…I’ve called you…I don’t know maybe it’s because I don’t understand but 
it’s like why they aren’t really taking the next step and being like ‘let me call 911, I’ll 
dispatch them’ cause they always say they do have a really close relationship with the 
[municipal] police so it’s kind of like sometimes they call and it’s like not our problem 
(S1).  
The discrepancy between what the students are experiencing and what the policy is could be the 
result of a disconnect in implementation at the dispatch level. If dispatch is supposed to take over 
and connect with 911 but are not, that could be a further source of dissonance.  
Jurisdiction and the Shaping of Other Security Measures 
While the perception of the special constables has suffered due to the conflicting 
definitions and understandings of campus space, there are other security policies and measures 
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shaped by the geographic definition of campus.  The placement of the university emergency 
pole, for example, illustrates the importance jurisdiction plays in security projects. The 
emergency pole is a large yellow pole that has a button on it that if pushed, activates a spinning 
blue light and sends a call to the special constables that someone at that location is in need of 
assistance. As many university students, staff, and administration explained, the pole is hard to 
miss and is located in a courtyard surrounded by university buildings. Its location is actually the 
only place outside of a building that is considered part of the campus jurisdiction and therefore, 
as one special constable explained, located in the only place on campus that it is allowed to be 
due to their jurisdictional constraints. They noted that to their knowledge, while it has been used 
for pranks, it has never once been used for an actual emergency (C14).  
Due to its location, many participants questioned if it was actually effective in its current 
position:  
Yeah. I would say that’s completely ineffective in that position. There’s four buildings 
right there…if somebody wants help for trouble or if someone is in trouble they’re going to 
run to one of the buildings they’re not going to be clicking one of the security poles. It’s 
just, it’s useless (S8). 
While many questioned the value of its placement, others, particularly students, were also 
concerned that the signal it dispatched would not be answered. Specifically, the students lacked 
faith that the signal would work, or that special constables would answer and come to help them. 
Interestingly, students’ answers showed that they did not experience fear in the spaces closely 
connected to campus, but instead, wanted security measures – such as the emergency pole – 
located around city bars, or large public squares where many local community members 
congregate for many hours of the day, rather than on campus property. While these pole 
positions may provide students with a greater feeling of safety, the special constables do not have 
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jurisdictional power at these locations. Yet in order to get from one class to another, students are 
often required to pass through these areas, raising the question of how much responsibility the 
university has over the safety of students on property they do not own but is essential to their 
ability to attend class.  
  Trespass orders are another measure that are bound by the same jurisdictional constraints 
placed on the special constables. A trespass order is issued by the university to change the way 
someone is allowed to interact with the campus and can be used in various degrees. For example 
at the least restrictive level, a person can be barred from a specific building like a residence, or 
from certain services like the athletic buildings (A13). A student can also be barred from campus 
buildings except for when they have scheduled classes and fifteen minutes before or after. 
Further, students can be restricted from entering a campus building in general. Administrator A7 
also noted that expulsion is different from a trespass order, because while a student may be 
trespassed from physically attending campus buildings, they may enroll in classes online. When 
a student is expelled, they may not enroll in any classes at the university, and may have a 
difficult time enrolling at other universities as well. A7 explained that this distinction is often 
drawn to protect a student’s future career and schooling, especially in cases where a student may 
have been charged during an incident with another student but has not yet gone to court.  It is 
worth noting that trespass orders are not just issued to students, but can also be applied to staff 
and community members. The decision to lay a trespass on someone depends on who is being 
trespassed and why the order is necessary. Local community members are often trespassed by 
the special constables due to repeated incidents or threatening behaviour, whereas students 
usually receive a trespass order in consultation with the university’s conduct or administrative 
student advocate’s office (A13).  
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 The lived experiences of these levels of trespass orders have demonstrated several key 
problems. Student participant S4 highlighted the consequences of how easy these orders are to 
break, and how it affected her perception of the legitimacy of the special constables. After she 
was sexually assaulted by another student, she reported the incident to the special constables, 
who took her statement and then brought in the municipal police. Unfortunately, the municipal 
police encouraged her to drop the case. Without formal charges, the university’s ability to take 
action against the student perpetrator was limited due to the structure of their policies. In 
consultation with university administrators, the student was encouraged to get a peace bond 
against the perpetrator which would then provide the school with grounds to take further action. 
As the student recounts: 
So I did drop the case and then the school, the school told me that they could figure it out 
you know just because I couldn’t criminalize him, they would do something. So they told 
me to go get a peace bond, which is essentially a restraining order and that I could do that 
in a day…So I went there and I ended up going to court probably 8 times, never got the 
peace bond (S4). 
Without this peace bond, university officials were unable to remove the student from campus and 
decided to try and keep them separated. The accused student was in her program, but was not 
allowed to enroll in courses that she was taking. To prohibit him from taking the same classes, 
the university provided him with a copy of her schedule, which enabled him to enroll in some of 
her classes and follow her on campus. As the student explains:  
…there was a lot of miscommunication, people wouldn’t relay things on, so like special 
constables would put let’s say if the student who had assaulted me came to my classes he 
was informed he was not allowed to come to classes. And then he would show up to try 
and find me. Special constables, they would be called they would arrest him and then I was 
told…he would have a two week suspension so he couldn’t be on campus. And then that 
had actually changed and it was only supposed to be for three days but that information 
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was not relayed back to me from special constables. So then I would see him, I would freak 
out, I would call them, they would tell me that they can’t do anything, but you know I was 
under the impression that it was a two week suspension when really it was only three days 
because they just forgot to tell me (S4). 
The experience of these measures is important to note because the fundamental nature of the 
separation agreements that kept the students separated continued to give him access to the same 
spaces as the victim and provided him with information about where she would be. While this 
was not the intention of the university, the nature of the measure and limited options facilitated 
further harassment. When he broke the existing agreements, due to the structure of the policies 
he was given a full trespass temporarily, but was able to continue his behaviour afterwards. 
Adding to the difficulty implementing trespass orders, these shifting levels of restrictions mean 
that the special constables are responsible for facilitating communication with the large web of 
stakeholders, while also maintaining their other daily tasks. These stakeholders can include the 
victim, perpetrator, faculty members in restricted classes, and university administrators.   
 Eventually, in conjunction with his other behaviour, university policies allowed the 
perpetrator to be trespassed from campus, but not expelled. On a ‘closed’ campus setting such as 
CANUN1, the person with a full trespass would be banned from the entire campus, including the 
pathways between buildings and food-service buildings on campus.  However, at an urban-
integrated campus, the application of full trespass orders are shaped and constrained by the 
geographical border of the campus meaning that a person can access areas that many students 
pass through. In interviews with administrators, it became apparent that due to the definition of 
campus as inside of university buildings, someone who was trespassed could technically stand 
outside of the building. As S4 explains, despite her attacker’s trespass order, she has still been 
followed by him and encounters him in spaces surrounding, but not on, university properties. 
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Special constables also noted that those who have been issued trespass orders are still seen 
frequenting areas outside campus buildings. Yet, as one special constable argues, individuals 
breaking trespass orders would be referred to the municipal police: “Because outside the building 
is city property, we can't lay a trespass for that it would be [municipal] police who would have 
to, they can in certain situations and generally only after a court order has gone through, can 
trespass somebody from the entire downtown core” (C14). 
 The power to trespass someone from the entire downtown core instead of just campus 
property was also discussed by A9, who noted that the city had previously exercised a power to 
ban certain people from the area, but mentioned that it was mostly used on sex workers. 
Importantly, A9 agreed that the university’s trespass use on the urban campus was flawed, and 
stated that they had considered asking the city for that same power to trespass people from the 
downtown core. This would extend trespasses to a defined area that would include campus 
buildings and the surrounding area. At the present time the university holds no such power, and 
there does not appear to have been a formal attempt to gain it. It also remains unclear how that 
would affect the jurisdiction of the special constables, if such a power would be granted. 
 Local community members can also have trespass orders placed on them. The frequent 
and persistent loitering of non-students, and what to do about it, was of particular concern among 
participant groups. In City2, many of the residents choose to spend their time at, and outside of, a 
local coffee shop that is located at the base of one of the university residence buildings. This 
specific coffee shop, however, was frequently mentioned as an area of concern by all participant 
groups. Although the coffee shop is part of the residence building structure, it cannot be entered 
or exited through the residence and is considered in the jurisdiction of the municipal police rather 
than the special constables. Participants in all groups frequently acknowledged a tension between 
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the local community members and the students, resulting in feelings of insecurity in students. 
Faculty member F12 explained a consequence of this, in the case of students who chose to leave 
the residence rather than face it for the entire year: 
[The local coffee shop] is to me, is the place I feel the least comfortable on campus and I 
understand that's not our campus but that's where the [residence] is. And I know several of 
those students including a friend of mine's daughter, she was put in [that residence] and she 
lasted about half the year and just spent the rest of the year driving home because she didn't 
like to walk to or from her building cause all the stuff that was happening outside of [the 
local coffee shop] (F12). 
 While aware of the problem, the university is unable to do much to ease the issue this 
creates for students due to the jurisdictional constraints. Administrators and special constables 
alike commented on the issue that the local coffee shop presents, and acknowledged that it makes 
many students feel uncomfortable and unsafe. Special constable C14 detailed the steps that they 
have attempted to take to quell the problem, but without more authority they are unable to make 
a large impact:  
No we only have [jurisdiction] for the residence so because of that we're doing extra 
patrols of [that residence] because we know that both people are there. So we're constantly 
checking the lobby, we're constantly checking the back alley ensuring that the doors are 
secured, making sure they're not hanging out on the stairs there. We laid a lot of trespass 
notices at the beginning of the term to try to get rid of these people so that they weren't just 
sitting on the stairs so that the students would have to walk by them so, that's the pretty 
much the biggest thing that we've done to try to combat that because we don't have 
authority at the [local coffee shop] (C14). 
It is also worth noting that how often the special constables can take these steps would likely be 
greatly affected by the resources they have to complete them, such as the number of officers they 
have available.   
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Additionally, these perceived problematic areas on campus are important because while 
administrators described low rates of reported victimization of students as proof that the campus 
is safe, these areas significantly affect whether it felt safe. Faculty members also acknowledged 
that the downtown area of CANUN2 does not always feel safe, but again pointed to statistics of 
reported victimization as being low. This feeling of insecurity was related to the climate of 
tension between the local community and the school:  
Just from a statistical standpoint we're safe right, it would be nice if we felt a little bit safer. 
Like I said at the very beginning I don't feel as safe but I don't think maybe that's as much 
the security as just the climate. The idea that there's that many more people hanging around 
than there potentially were (F12). 
This quote highlights that the tension between the university and the local community is not just 
experienced by students, and that it can even affect faculty members. 
Overall, it appeared that the students interviewed felt that the security measures currently 
in place were not being deployed in an effective manner, and their negative interactions with the 
special constables caused the students to view their services as ineffective. These negative 
interactions often stemmed from confusion over what spaces they had jurisdiction over, and the 
fundamental disagreement over what constitutes campus. Student participants mentioned this 
feeling of insecurity as being detrimental to their experience at CANUN2 and contributing to a 
negative perception of the special constables. 
Contextual and Institutional Factors 
Limited Resources of the Special Constables 
As mentioned previously, the special constables are bound not only by their jurisdictional 
constraints, but also by the amount of resources allocated to them. In fact, participants 
resoundingly expressed the need for more special constables. For instance, one participant noted 
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that while they are supposed to have seven special constables on rotation, only four of those 
positions are presently filled (S15). Administrator A7 noted that this was the result of a high rate 
of turnover in the department. Most administrators noted they wanted one special constable to be 
in the office at all times to manage walk-ins and phone calls, as well as to see more special 
constables patrolling on foot or in cruisers. They also suggested that having special constables 
available to participate in education programs on campus could increase the perceived presence 
of the special constables, and give students practical knowledge on how to navigate the urban 
environment (A13).  
The special constables interviewed also wanted to see an increase in the number of 
officers. Special constable C18 explained that the quotient of officers has not kept up with the 
expansion of the university. They added that with the current number of officers was not 
sufficient to address illness of injury, often leaving the present officers alone and vulnerable, or 
taking on too much overtime. At times, they relied on contract security to try and make up the 
slack. Another officer noted that while two officers are required to be on at once, it would be a 
large help to be able to have three:  
Yeah, it would be nice to have three. Reason being you get out on a call, you can be tied up 
for 2 or 3 hours on one call. Well if it takes two of you to do that then everything else is 
getting left so having that third body you're able to divide and conquer…so one can be 
patrolling the buildings and taking care of that while one's dealing with the situation and 
the one in the middle can pick up where you know I need a hand here, I need a hand here. 
It's always better to have more bodies than not enough (C14). 
As C14 describes here, the special constables feel they would provide better service with more 
officers. However, the decision over how many officers to employ is made with regards to 
budget and resource allocation and they do not appear to have significant input in the matter.  
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Students and faculty wanted to see more of an active presence of the special constables 
on campus. Faculty noted seeing the special constables less around campus throughout their 
tenure at the university, and many student participants described rarely ever seeing the special 
constables around campus at all. A higher perceived presence of the special constables on 
campus could aid them in growing perceived legitimacy. The importance placed on this presence 
means that the perceived need for more special constables has had a negative impact on the way 
security has been experienced on campus. Following the earlier mentioned incident where 
student participant S3 had been followed and harassed by two local community members, she 
recalled a conversation she had with the special constables as they explained the length of time it 
took for her to receive assistance:  
The first thing they told me was that they, well they told me that they’re understaffed 
which I don’t care and I don’t want to know. All I want to know is why there wasn’t 
someone there when I needed them (S3). 
The student continued that her negative experience with the special constables, wholly changed 
her perception of security on campus. This exemplifies how these interactions can influence the 
perception of legitimacy of the special constables, even when the issues at hand are out of the 
control of the special constables such as with jurisdiction or funding. While differing definitions 
of campus may have contributed to conflicts with the jurisdictional model, the perception that 
there are not enough officers on staff appears to add to these conflicts. 
Decrease in Municipal Police Presence 
The municipal police have considerable influence over the downtown area that the 
campus is situated in, and over the special constables. The special constables’ service report to, 
and are mandated by, the municipal police service. The municipal police have jurisdiction over 
all of the areas that the special constables do not, and also are able to take over the response to or 
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investigation of serious crimes that occur on campus property. Unfortunately this agreement is 
affected by a current fiscal environment of austerity in City2. As a result, the specialized police 
unit responsible for patrolling the downtown core has faced a significant reduction in presence. 
A special constable participant noted this cutback: 
No it's been up and down over the years like right now they're down to two officers and 
they're only here Monday to Friday. At one point we had eight officers on the [municipal 
downtown] unit so that's the problem when [municipal] police get short-handed, the 
[municipal downtown]  unit is usually the first one that they'll pull the bodies from to put 
onto the platoons (C14). 
This has had an impact on many of the activities in the downtown, and when asked directly, 
another special constable participant said that they had witnessed an increase in crime since the 
unit’s downsizing (C18). This sentiment was even echoed by a university administrator, who has 
experienced this staffing shortage firsthand:  
Again this is a funding issue the city of [City2] needs more funding so that they can have 
more [municipal downtown] officers on…their hours were cut back. So they're not down 
here all the time and generally when they're down here you'll always see a [municipal 
downtown] officer interacting with a member of the public. It might be a university student 
too but they are constantly always interacting with something happening whether it's 
maybe a friendly conversation but most of the time they're addressing drugs or alcohol use 
or we see a lot of general disturbances either in the park, like I see them from my window 
you know people outside the area here by the church fighting with each other, physically 
fighting yelling and screaming with each other (A13).  
Yet not all university administration feels this way. One participant, for example, said 
that the integration of the campus with the downtown core allows for twice as much patrolling as 
you would expect (A7). This, however, was not a common sentiment among participants, as 
another administrator pointed out that when they had more officers patrolling there was more of 
a sense of security, but now due to cutbacks, there is very minimal patrolling:  
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Yeah so we have our downtown like our [municipal downtown]  officers, which I think 
you know are now down to just one person, so with changes with [municipal] police 
services, although we get lots of support with the police in downtown, there's only one 
[municipal downtown] officer on for the time being. I think he works between 8 and 4, his 
name [redacted] he's great. And that was really having people walking around in the 
downtown, like our 8 [municipal downtown] officers, I think that added to this idea of 
what safety and security meant (A9).  
With the specific context of the downtown of City2 and its high crime rate, the interplay between 
the limited jurisdiction of the special constables and the availability of municipal police officers 
is crucial. When students call for assistance in the downtown, the municipal downtown police 
unit cutbacks may mean that a special constable would be able to respond faster than the 
municipal police. However, due to their jurisdictional limitations, they would be unable to 
respond as anything more than a civilian. As one special constable pointed out, while on 
university property they can arrest someone for committing a crime, but on city-property which 
includes the sidewalks in between university buildings, they cannot arrest someone unless they 
witness the crime occurring.   
Overall, the particular context of the campus in an impoverished urban area, the limited 
resources of the special constables, and the decrease in the presence of the municipal police are 
factors that appear to further challenge the perceptions of legitimacy of the special constables, 
and exacerbate issues with the jurisdictional model. While the number of special constables is 
the only one of these factors that is under university control, it is important to note that due to the 
multi-campus style of CANUN, administrators at CANUN1 are likely making budget decisions 
about CANUN2. Those at CANUN1 may not have the same understanding of the local context, 
the decreasing numbers of municipal police when making these decisions or the specific 
jurisdictional challenges at CANUN2.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
  The differing perceptions of ‘campus’ have caused confusion over what jurisdiction the 
special constables are bound to, and the resultant negative interactions have delegitimized the 
perception of the special constables in the eyes of many students. These negative interactions are 
also influenced by the specific context of the urban area they are integrated with, and the 
resources available to both the special constables and municipal police. Conflict around the 
jurisdiction of university police services is not new (Jacobsen, 1995; Peath et al., 2008), however 
the aggravating factors of resource allocation and the urban context, and the particularly 
restrictive limitations to the jurisdiction of the special constables at CANUN2 appear to be 
worsening it.  
As demonstrated above, the confusion around jurisdictional lines has resulted in negative 
feelings towards the special constables, which often manifests in questions of their legitimacy. 
The effect of confusion on legitimacy was also found by Patten, Alward, Tomhas and Wada 
(2016), who noted that students’ lack of understanding of campus police roles and 
responsibilities often correlated with lower levels of perceived legitimacy. The authors described 
the effects of this in terms of police-citizen relationships: “When legitimacy is diluted, police-
citizen contacts become strained. As police-citizen contacts become strained, police effectiveness 
is destabilized (Patton et al., 2016, 569).” This is of particular concern for CANUN2, as 
confusion around when special constables can aid students or not has caused a decrease in their 
level of perceived legitimacy as an authority, often causing them to be bypassed as an authority 
altogether. With this destabilization, their presence may not be viewed as a significant deterrence 
to crime on campus. Equally as crucial, Aiello and Lawton (2018) found that the perceived 
legitimacy of campus police is “significantly related to reporting likelihood (p. 1)”. While 
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CANUN2’s administrators, faculty and special constables were quick to point to the campus as 
being statistically safe, the low perceived legitimacy of the special constables may mean a low 
frequency of reporting by students. This is evidenced by the student participants’ discussions of 
bypassing special constables and going straight to the municipal police, or handling 
circumstances themselves.   
The issue that is being exemplified at CANUN2 is that with an unorthodox campus 
shape, in an unorthodox urban campus locale, the limited jurisdiction of the special constables is 
not enough. Students’ calls are frequently outside of their jurisdiction, and it is negatively 
impacting their perceived legitimacy and effectiveness on campus. Additionally, measures they 
enforce, such as trespass orders, are being undermined by these same restrictions. The issue of 
placement of the emergency pole was one that was mentioned by almost all student participants, 
and their suggestions of where it should be instead exemplifies their perceptions of campus and 
the unique challenges they face in the urban context. They are not worried about their safety on 
official campus property, but are more worried about the harassment or tension they face 
walking past bars, city establishments or the local coffee shop. This in combination with the 
arguable need for more officers and the cut-backs placed on the municipal downtown police unit, 
have left the student participants feeling insecure in areas they view as campus, regardless of 
whether the university feels the same.  
With staffing and budgetary issues for both the special constables and the municipal 
police, it begs the question why restrict resources to limited jurisdictions? It is worth exploring 
whether the University-Precinct model described by Jacobsen (1995) would be more effective at 
CANUN2. In this model, campus police officers are granted jurisdiction not only over campus 
property, but property adjoining it for an extended period that is negotiated with the municipal 
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police service. A memorandum of understanding is often reached between the two services 
(Jacobsen, 1995), and in this case could regard only answering calls from students or staff in that 
area, or only having that jurisdiction during certain hours of the day when students are frequently 
on campus. The special constables already work closely with and under the mandate of the 
municipal police service, so this extended jurisdiction could still be easily monitored by the 
municipal police. This is where Valverde’s (2009) importance of how bodies are governing, 
rather than who is doing the governing is best illuminated. With the focus currently placed on 
drawing jurisdictional lines in the sand, the practicality of the application of security measures is 
being lost. If the emphasis was instead placed on what methods of governance would be the most 
effective, especially considering limited resources, the authority of the special constables might 
be viewed as more effective. For example, if students were able to contact the special constables 
to deal with issues such as harassment when walking between classes, that would free up the 
remaining municipal downtown police officers to handle other local community issues. Due to 
the students’ definitions of ‘campus’ as not only the university-owned property, this would likely 
increase the perceived legitimacy of the special constables as an effective authority rather than 
symbolic presence. In the next chapter, how security measures contribute to students feeling safe 
and being safe is discussed, as well as how priorities of the university may affect how this 
jurisdiction was negotiated.  
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Chapter Five: Dueling Interests 
Introduction  
When visiting university campuses on recruitment tours, many students and parents want 
to know if the student will be ‘safe’ while attending the institution. However, would the answer 
they receive be whether they would be safe, or feel safe? The security of students is important 
from a physical security perspective, but also from one of self-interest. If someone inquired 
about safety at CANUN, they would likely get directed towards visible security measures as 
proof that they are in a safe environment. However, there would likely be other security 
measures present that were not pointed out. This chapter illustrates how security measures at 
CANUN2 demonstrate the simultaneous goals of physical security and those resulting from 
corporatization such as recruitment, marketing, and budgetary constraints. Valverde (2011b) 
notes that examining how techniques are used can evidence their purpose or the logic behind 
them, and that an in-depth, fluid examination is what is required to accomplish this. In the 
following chapter, I detail many visible and invisible techniques’ intended and unintended 
consequences, and what that may illuminate about the goals and priorities at CANUN2.  
The Relationship Between Logic and Techniques 
According to Valverde (2011b), techniques are the measures a security project uses to 
ensure their goals are realized. The goals of a project reflect its logic; the assumptions that 
underscore what techniques are implemented. Examining the techniques of a project, entails 
examining how security measures are used, and why they are being used (Valverde, 2001; 
2011b). While Valverde posits that a practical application of her theory is necessary for proper 
illustration of these relationships, she makes a number of assertions about both the logic and 
techniques of security projects in general. First, Valverde (2011b) notes that the relationship 
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between techniques of a project and its logic can be fluid, as projects that have similar logics 
may utilize different techniques. For example, two countries may both share the goal of 
securitizing their airports to prevent acts of terrorism, but the techniques they use to achieve this 
may vary. Valverde (2011b) describes: “In general, just as different logics of security provision 
can coexist and flourish, since an increase in one by no means necessitates a decline in other 
logics, so too the array of techniques actually used at any given time for a specific purpose 
cannot be predicted in advance” (p.17). This is why it is crucial to study techniques within the 
context or security project they are occurring in, rather than in general. If one was to study the 
use of security cameras, they would likely have very different purposes on public streets, inside 
homes, or outside voting locations depending on the circumstances of their use.  
Additionally, Valverde (2011b) argues that while similar logics can exist within a society, 
so can differing logics: “…it seems to me that the major reason for this oddly peaceful 
coexistence of contradictory logics is that different projects operate at different scales and/or 
across different jurisdictions (p. 12).” Generally, Valverde (2011b) focuses on the existence of 
multiple logics in the same society or system, but the current study seeks to explore how multiple 
logics may exist in the same security project and institution. Consequently, it will also examine if 
they conflict, and what the repercussions of this are. Valverde (2011b) suggests that the key 
question is not how many logics are visible, but what methodology is best to illustrate the 
“shifting relations among heterogeneous (and sometimes incommensurable) logics (p.12).” With 
in-depth qualitative methods, the present study pursues the idea that examining the use and 
perception of techniques from various stakeholders within a project can differentiate between 
logics at CANUN2, and assess how any conflicts or shifts in logic are negotiated.  
64 
 
This research seeks to fill the need of a concrete examination of the relationship between 
the logic and techniques of a project, particularly in combination with the jurisdictional focus of 
the previous chapter. Valverde (2011b) suggests that  
A dynamic analysis of the implementation of security projects, and of the reflexive 
adjustment of logics, jurisdictions and techniques in the wake of implementation, is the 
kind of empirical project that would give us a truly accurate, dynamic picture of how we 
are now being governed through projects that might all appeal to security but which differ 
so much as to make generalizations impossible (p.18). 
By interviewing administrators, special constables, students and faculty, this research will 
examine the creation, implementation and lived experience of visible and invisible techniques in 
order to attempt to provide this dynamic picture. In the ensuing sections, I will first describe the 
way participants use and perceive visible measures, followed by invisible measures. While I 
acknowledge that techniques are never entirely visible or invisible, this difference was gauged by 
the awareness of measures by participants. Then, these measures will be connected to potential 
goals and priorities of the university.  
Visible Techniques 
Some visible measures in place at CANUN2 that will be discussed in this section are the 
special constables, the emergency pole, and panic buttons. These measures were often discussed 
by participants as ones they were most aware of, or actively interacted with. In this section, the 
use of these visible measures will be described, as well as how the university assesses (or does 
not assess) techniques for intended consequences, and outline potential unintended consequences 
as well.  
Visible security measures are important to analyze, particularly because many 
participants viewed the definition of security on campus as the presence of an authority figure. 
They believed that the knowledge that an authority was watching was enough to prevent many 
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crimes from occurring, and viewed these elements as deterrents of crime. As one student 
participant explained:  
I think even just the presence of an authority figure amongst the population is enough to 
sort of subdue any hostilities from occurring. Or the idea that somebody is watching is 
enough to sort of subdue people from saying ‘oh maybe I could or should do something’ 
(S8). 
Awareness of security measures is crucial for them to command this feeling of authority, and 
participants often described actively looking for what security measures were in place when they 
first toured the university, or while they walked throughout campus. In general, no participants 
felt there were too many visible security techniques in use at CANUN2, and most student 
participants actually expressed a desire to increase them. They felt that a greater presence of 
visible measures would make them feel more secure on campus, illustrating a strong connection 
between visible measures and the perception of security at the institution as a whole.  
However, the close relationship between visible security measures and the experience of 
security meant that participants frequently felt insecure when they realized that the visible 
measures may not be as effective as they originally thought when they actually used them. This 
often came from a negative interaction where a measure had a perceptually lengthy response 
rate, or no response at all. For example, at CANUN2, administrator A16 estimated that there are 
around 50 panic buttons around campus. These panic buttons are usually part of an employee’s 
work station, but on occasion staff members can be issued buttons that travel around campus 
with them. In theory, the buttons are there so if a staff member experiences an emergency, they 
can push the button and it will relay to the special constables’ dispatch that someone is in need of 
assistance. However, when asked how the university decided that the introduction of panic 
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buttons was worth the money, administrator A13 noted that in their opinion, the introduction of 
the buttons was only to make people feel safer, not to actually raise the level of security: 
I wouldn't be able to articulate that necessarily the panic buttons did anything other than 
give people that sense of security…that I think all around it kind of gave a nice, warm, 
snuggly to everybody on campus that there was a lot of security put in place to help people 
(A13). 
The doubt around the button’s actual contribution to security was evidenced by a student-
employee participant whose co-worker needed to push the button because of a situation with a 
local community member, but the response was less than what they had expected:  
I do know one of my co-workers had to push the button two years ago and then it took 15 
minutes for special constables to come, so if we’re in a very unsafe situation and we push 
the panic button and 15 minutes later they show up, I just feel like 911 would be so much 
faster (S1). 
S1 further noted that by the time the special constable arrived, the situation was over. By 
discussing the effectiveness of 911 in relation to the panic buttons, S1 demonstrated the potential 
degradation in buy-in to security measures after a negative interaction. While making people feel 
safer can be a helpful tool if there are no substantial threats, when those measures are later relied 
on in the face of actual threats and they are not effective, it can lower the user’s feeling of 
security.   
Evaluative Measures 
During the research, I inquired about how the university defines the success of its 
security measures, and how they evaluate this success. In this section, these definitions and 
measures will be discussed. In the previous chapter, the special constable participants explained 
that the emergency pole has never actually been used for an emergency. In order for a measure 
such as the emergency pole to be implemented and operated, the university must first invest 
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financial resources. However, if there is little use of the measure, it raises the question as to why 
they continue to be financially maintained. Unfortunately, it can be hard to ascertain what a 
security measure’s intended purpose or contribution to security is without a clear definition of 
success. For example, without the knowledge that the emergency pole had never been used, it 
may appear to outsiders that the measure is instrumental to the securitization of the campus. Yet, 
it did not appear that any security measures on campus were internally evaluated, or had 
established definitions of success. One of the areas that evaluative tools appeared most 
ambiguous, regarded the special constables and what mechanisms are designed to measure their 
effectiveness. One special constable participant responded this when asked about how they 
define their success: 
[You] can’t really go by statistics in terms of calls for service, because I do know that since 
I’ve come here our calls for service have almost tripled from what they were before and 
maybe that’s also due to the fact we’re now 24-7 and we’re now capturing calls for service 
that were never properly captured before, because we were only on two shifts prior to the 
24-7. But yeah in terms of our success, it’s hard to say. How do you judge the success of a 
police department? (C5). 
In this quote, special constable C5 notes that using calls for service would not work as a measure 
of success, because changes in call frequency do not necessarily correlate with criminal 
occurrences. Conversely, another special constable (C14) responded that the increase in calls for 
service meant they were doing well because the incidents were occurring at night before but 
were not being captured due to the lack of 24-7 coverage. This discrepancy illustrates the catch-
22 of calls for service as a definition of success. If calls for service go up, it could mean that 
crime is increasing, or that the special constables are doing a good job capturing incidents. 
However, if calls go down, it might mean crime is decreasing, or that students are not reporting 
to the special constables. Therefore, either way it can be successful or unsuccessful based on 
68 
 
how it is spun. Furthering the confusion, while the special constables were divided on whether 
they use their calls for service to define their success, administrators seemed to believe 
otherwise: 
Special constables will do how many calls they've answered and it's just because there's an 
increase in calls that doesn't mean that's a bad thing either because that means people are 
more aware of the service and they're using it. They track, I mean you can look at the…the 
special constable annual report they put the number of calls in there and they have all of 
that information (A16). 
The broader reason there may be a lack of evaluative measures, is that in many instances, it was 
unclear what “success” for a security measure was. While ‘making students safer’ was often 
given as the goal or purpose of security measures in general, there did not appear to be defined 
intended consequences of specific measures, or a definition of what being ‘safer’ constituted. If 
the goal is increased physical safety, how can the university gauge if the measures are making 
anyone safer if they are not evaluating them? In the next section, the use of invisible techniques 
will be examined, as well as descriptions of any evaluative tools in place for those measures.  
Invisible Techniques 
Contrary to the measures in the previous section, CANUN2 employs two security 
measures that are not marketed or visible, yet the administrators maintain they are some of their 
most effective tools at preventing harm. These measures include the Behavioural Intervention 
Team (BIT), and its threat assessment team. BIT is a committee with members from various 
departments on campus such as the administrative student advocate’s office, the health and 
wellness centre, their student support services, the special constables and the student conduct 
office. Committee policy dictates that all members receive training on the Structured Interview 
for Violence Risk Assessment (SIVRA-35) through the National Behavioural Intervention Team 
Association (NaBITA), which is used to determine the threat and need level of student or staff 
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member. The NaBITA website lists behaviours assessed by SIVRA-35 as ‘direct communicated 
threats’, observable behaviours/language/factors’ and ‘contextual environmental factors’ 
(National Behavioral Intervention Team Association, 2018).  In this section, the relationship 
between these measures and university priorities will be discussed, with a particular focus on the 
intonations of this measure as it relates to institutional concerns.  
 Generally, the way that BIT works is that a student or staff member is identified by any 
service or other staff member on campus as experiencing ‘concerning behaviour’. They are then 
referred to BIT and are discussed at a round-table of sorts. According to A9 ‘concerning 
behaviour’ can be disruptive, bizarre, or threatening. However students with what is viewed as 
threatening behaviour to either themselves or others, often get sent to the threat assessment team 
portion instead. The definition of these types of behaviours is not always clear. In contrast, A7 
said that concerning behaviour is anything that makes the person observing it feel uncomfortable 
in their gut, that the behaviour does not make sense and you can see them struggling. A7 notes 
that there is usually a precipitating event before BIT looks at a student, and most often it deals 
with mental health issues. This may be important to a university for a number of reasons. While 
a university is likely interested in the well-being of their students, they may also be acting from 
self-interest. Massie (2008) argues that many universities are sued over the suicides of their 
students, and cites judicial decisions in various cases that have found that a university carries 
some responsibility to prevent these incidents.  
  At the BIT meeting, each group identifies whether they have met with the student and in 
what regard (with the exception of when it is not permitted such as the nature of medical visits). 
The threat assessment team contains a segment of BIT members who are trained on specific 
threat assessment tools that places a person from low to high risk. When deemed necessary, 
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specialties may be brought in such as lawyers, doctors, social workers or health professionals. 
When there is an ‘imminent’ threat (which was defined based on the risk score), BIT is 
accelerated to a detailed threat assessment purpose (A7).  
Most administrators framed the invisible measure of BIT as extremely useful as it was 
perceived to serve a purpose that other security measures do not: “Like the students that come to 
BIT, BIT's there for a reason. In the past those students would often be asked to leave so BIT's 
there to really try to work with students to figure out how we can best support them (A9).” While 
administrators noted that the special constables are an effective service, they frequently 
referenced BIT and the threat assessment team as the standard to which threats are defined and 
dealt with by the university, rather than any other measure. When asked what they defined a 
threat as, or what the university viewed as the biggest threats, administrators repeatedly reached 
for the threat assessment tools to answer. In stark contrast, students frequently defined threats as 
sexual violence or tension with the local community members, and special constables often 
mentioned active-shooters as “the biggest threat that everyone fears on any campus of course 
(C5).” Interestingly, and aligned with student participants, the special constables also frequently 
noted that common offenses (such as assaults and drug use) by the students and the local 
community as another large threat. 
 While BIT appears to be a wide-reaching security measure that involves many services 
and some of the most at-risk individuals on campus, its existence remains largely unknown 
amongst students. Administrators admit that they have not yet been marketing the measure to 
current or prospective students. Administrator participant A9 explained that if there is a formal 
complaint, students are usually made aware but they may not be told what was disclosed about 
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them in order to protect those making disclosures. However, A13 explained that how students are 
made aware may be a little more complicated:  
I don't think the student is always aware, from my role and I can't speak to each person 
who brings students to the table, I'm usually quite open with my students especially if I'll 
have a student come in and they'll say what are you going to do with this information?... 
Again, we don't have anything within our operating procedures that says we don't tell 
students, we just, if a student were to ask we would tell them but we don't outwardly 
communicate that to students (A13). 
Throughout interviews, administrators touted the importance of BIT, and argued that while 
it has only been at CANUN2 for five years, it has become a crucial part of ensuring student 
safety. The question then begs to be asked, why does CANUN not market it widely to the student 
body if it is so successful? One of the main reasons that administrators pointed to, was the way it 
appears:  
Scary name, and we always tell students when we've talked about them at the behavioural 
intervention teams, it's always like ‘why are you talking about me at this team’? Once we 
explain what it is and I can answer all your questions about it, it's a little bit easier to 
understand what it does. Most people call them CARE teams but we just kept it as [the 
behavioural intervention team] (A9). 
One of the reasons that BIT sounds ‘scary’ could be related to the overt way it feels connected to 
inward-facing securitization. When students and their families are looking for a ‘safe’ 
environment to attend, they are looking for measures that will keep the student safe from threats 
to them, not from the potential threat that the student may pose. BIT brings to reality the idea that 
students pose a risk, whether to themselves or others, and that part of the climate of securitization 
at universities is monitoring the behaviour of those who attend it as well.  When asked if 
CANUN had enough security measures, A16 noted the importance of this balance: “I mean you 
could always make it better but we don't want to turn it into a prison right? We want the students 
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to feel comfortable (A16).” Non-visible security measures are a way to reinforce security, 
without students becoming uncomfortable with the inward nature of some of the measures. 
Valverde (2011b) noted that it is important to examine how a technique is being used to 
demonstrate the project’s logic. In terms of CANUN, the covert way that BIT is used could 
reflect that the university considers how the students will perceive a technique when determining 
how visible it will be.  
As with the visible security measures on campus, there does not appear to be a clear way of 
defining the success of the invisible measures. For example, A13 acknowledged they do not yet 
have a way to evaluate BIT, but stressed their success as the myriad of impacts it can have on 
students’ lives:  
I think right now until we develop some more evaluative tools, that's success for us right 
now, making sure students are connected. Some of them won't graduate, and that's not seen 
as a failure. Some of the students that we work with, they go to rehab and some of the 
students switch to college, or some leave altogether and go home. That's success still 
because they're taking care of themselves and they're hopefully on the way to success even 
if it's not still here at [CANUN] (A13). 
However, as with the special constables and the frequency of their calls for service, this 
definition does not leave much room for a measure to be unsuccessful. Of course, with 
something like a threat assessment team, a failure would likely amount to the threat becoming a 
reality, but outside of that it is unclear how the teams will evaluate their effectiveness moving 
forward. Additionally, while multiple administrators pointed to SIVRA-35 as being a main threat 
assessment tool for BIT, and also argued that BIT is used largely for self-harm cases, the 
NaBITA website directly notes that SIVRA-35 is not designed to assess suicidal tendencies in a 
student (National Behavioral Intervention Team Association, 2018). This illustrates the potential 
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gap between how measures are intended to be used and are being used, something that could be 
discovered through internal evaluation. 
 While the balance of security measures appears to lean towards outward-facing and 
visible measures, participants explained that they may be getting more invisible ones in the 
future. A participant noted that CANUN is in the process of getting facial-recognition technology 
for their security cameras, which they will begin using first in areas such as libraries that are 
accessible to both the public and students, and areas that have previously had a high number of 
incidents occur. The differentiation between visible and invisible measures may become less 
pronounced as more technologies of this manner become increasingly available and as invisible 
measures become able to be embedded in visible measures (such as facial recognition technology 
being used through visible security cameras). People want to feel safe from outside threats, rather 
than be considered threats themselves. With the ability to embed inward-facing and invisible 
measures that may make people uncomfortable into existing visible measures that make them 
feel safe, real goals of a security project can be hidden behind stated ones. In the next section, 
further relationships between invisible and visible measures will be discussed, as well as what 
their use demonstrates about the potential logics underscoring CANUN2.  
Duality of Security: Physical Security and Corporatization 
Reflecting on the ‘logic’ of CANUN2 as a security project, it appears that CANUN has 
two priorities: 1) physical security, and 2) goals resulting from the corporatization of universities 
such as marketing, and institutional risk management (Rothstein, 2006). Institutional risks 
include avoiding lawsuits, and reputational and recruitment priorities. Security measures play a 
significant role for both of these goals, and some security measures appeal to both purposes, such 
as the special constables. In general, the special constables are used for marketing security on 
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campus and minimizing institutional risk, but all levels of stakeholders also view them as playing 
a role in physical security. On the other hand, as will be discussed further, certain aspects of 
these measures, such as the reluctance to shift the special constables to a 24-7 schedule, 
demonstrates when the goals can be competing, such as physical security versus budget 
priorities. In this section, key theoretical concepts that emerged during the analysis of the 
relationship between techniques and logic will be outlined, followed by explanations as to how 
the aforementioned goals were discovered, and how they relate to these concepts.  
Corporatization refers to the drift in governance models at institutions toward those 
reflecting typical practices of a business (Mills, 2012). The emphasis placed on security by 
corporations in general was one that Loader (1999) connects to consumer culture, and the belief 
that consumers will gain satisfaction from further engaging with a product (security). Similarly, 
from a marketing perspective, Mills (2012) also notes that during the process of corporatization 
at universities, in many ways students have begun to be viewed, and treated, as customers. 
Corporatization of post-secondary institutions has been the frequent subject of recent literature. 
Mills (2012) argues: “The most visible sign of the corporatization of higher education lies in the 
commitment that colleges and universities have made to winning the ratings war perpetuated by 
the kinds of ranking U.S. News and World Report now offers in its annual ‘Best Colleges’ 
guide” (p.1). Mills (2012) expands that recruitment is crucial to a university’s perception and 
ranking. He argues that universities will often seek to gain many more applicants than they can 
hold, because high rejection rates increase their reputational perception. Giroux (2002) posits 
that the societal rise of neoliberalism has spurred the corporatization of universities, as they also 
increasingly become more focused on market relations.  
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The influence of corporatization on security is often related to the ways the institution 
manages risk. Rothstein’s (2006) definition of institutional risk management could be expanded 
in this context to include a university’s attempt to minimize opportunities for harm to physical 
security, but these also provide benefits to their brand and market relations. In his operational 
definition, Rothstein (2006) termed “liabilities, bureaucratic failure and loss of reputation” (p. 
216) as institutional risks, and it is similarly repurposed here. 1 
Additionally, while analyzing the logic of the project, much of the participants’ 
interactions with security measures appeared to connect to Schneier’s (2003) concept of security 
theater. Schneier (2003) defines security as being, in part, a state of mind. As he later expands 
“…you can be secure even though you don’t feel secure. And you can feel secure even though 
you’re not (Schneier, 2008, p. 50)”. Additionally, he notes that the perception of security may 
not be congruent with the reality of it. For example, many participants directly defined security 
as the presence of visible security measures, or a perceived authority, rather than active outcomes 
they provide.  Security measures often take the emphasis on the mere presence of a measure into 
account, and can provide people with the feeling of security as well as actual physical security. 
However, some measures only provide the feeling of security while providing no tangible 
benefits to the ‘reality’ of the security, and thus he terms these ‘security theater’ (Schneier, 
2003).  
At CANUN2, one of the clearest examples of security theater was the emergency pole. 
As established previously, the pole is very visible and was identified as a security measure 
universally, without ever being used by someone who needed aid. Also mentioned earlier, S1 
had been instructed to specifically note the emergency pole and special constables during 
                                                     
1 In this context, ‘risk management’ is being discussed from a conceptual perspective, rather than as it may be used 
by institutions under health and safety legislation for employees. 
76 
 
recruitment tours. This drew a distinct connection between the use of security theater, and 
corporatization of universities. The university’s emphasis on a ‘safe’ environment, particularly 
during recruitment tours, was echoed by another student participant: 
And when I did a tour…they said that when you give out a tour don’t allude to any 
personal experiences, which is fair…but that the same time if you’re a tour guide you are 
alluding to a personal experience and that personal experience from one person to another 
is very, very important, it’s a critical review. And they said to us don’t do it, don’t tell them 
anything, don’t say anything…they were just saying only say that we have special 
constables and it’s a great program and that’s it end of story (S8). 
Recruitment is crucial for any post-secondary institution, as tuition dollars are an extremely large 
source of income for them. Gregory (2012) argues that a university’s ‘safe’ environment, is a key 
part of their brand. These sentiments were echoed by a number of students and faculty who felt 
that recruiting a high number of students was CANUN’s main goal. In fact, one faculty member 
went so far as to say that over their time at the university, they had come to view the institution’s 
main goal to be fostering positive public perception – something the participant likened to 
propaganda: 
Propaganda. Like the public view. I would think that that would be their predominant 
[goal], it's not their stated goal. Their stated goal would be to keep our students safe. I think 
the public perception would be the first thing, that's generally what we worry about. We 
worry about how everybody else sees us because if they see us as good they'll send their 
kids here. If they see us as not good they won't send kids here. That's a very, very, cynical 
view but I've been here for long enough. I would guess that their stated goal is to keep our 
students safe, physically safe (F12, emphasis added). 
This quote illustrates the duality of goals that the university faces. Most of the participants 
acknowledged that the university had a seemingly genuine interest in the physical security of 
students, however, they frequently contrasted this goal with other, often competing interests that 
drew from the same pool of limited financial and human resources. 
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Casella (2003) argues that many schools have chosen to implement expensive security 
technologies because the liability they face as institutions is deemed to be far greater than the 
initial expense of their inclusion. For example, the shooting at Virginia Tech in 2007 is estimated 
to have cost the university alone $38.7 million and municipal, state and federal governments a 
further $9.5 million (Johnson, 2012). Specifically, Virginia Tech spent $11.4 million on ‘safety 
and security upgrades’ following the incident, including hiring more campus police officers and 
creating emergency management strategies (Johnson, 2012). Boyle and Haggerty (2012) argue 
that as we become more aware of risks, particularly “unpredictable, high consequence risks” 
(p.243), agencies and institutions may engage in speculative risk prevention, focusing on many 
low-probability but high consequence scenarios. In addition, Giroux (2002) argues that the 
neoliberalism that gave rise to corporatization of post-secondary institutions is incongruent with 
any type of morality, and what was most advantageous to the market relations of a university 
would be prioritized. In this respect, institutions turn to security technologies for physical 
security, but also to avoid risk of liabilities. Unfortunately, many participants also felt that the 
institution would lean toward the goals of corporatization, emphasizing branding over internal 
concerns. As a second faculty member explained, the university straddles a line between 
priorities: 
I think in a rosey view I would say they want to keep everybody safe, and I think they also 
want to protect themselves from lawsuits and from bad publicity so I think it's multi-
purpose. So obviously they don't want anything to happen to our students and I think the 
measures that they're trying to put into place or trying to address the safety of our students, 
because you want your students to come here and be safe. And I think the university, I 
think all of us feel responsible if somebody's injured or damaged in some way because 
they're a student here like no one wants that so I think that's probably the prime goal of the 
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university but also obviously they don't want to end up in the news any more than they 
already have (F11). 
While recruitment is important to the university from a functional perspective, as this quote 
demonstrates, avoiding liability is an important example of institutional risk management as 
well. If there is a significant gap in security measures and an incident happens, the university can 
be vulnerable to a lawsuit, or negative publicity.  
With the corporatization of post-secondary education, not only does a university have to 
consider lawsuits stemming from the failure to institute proper measures but they need to be 
concerned about when measures are used as well. The student discussed in the previous chapter 
who was sexually assaulted on CANUN2 property, noted that she was told by a university 
official that banning her assailant from campus without formal charges from the police, left them 
open to a lawsuit from the perpetrator: 
I think generally their priority is the students obviously, they want to keep the students 
safe, but they also don’t want to make the school look bad….It’s hard because I know they 
care about the students but I also know that they look at the bigger picture of [CANUN], 
they don’t want [CANUN] to get sued and be put in the papers. They even told me that too, 
that we can’t risk [CANUN’s], name for the sake of a student, of a he-said-she-said, so it’s 
hard. That’s one person right, like there’s a lot of people that care and also were really on 
my side…so that’s really difficult but I think in the end, it’s what’s going to make 
[CANUN] look best (S4). 
Importantly, this quote shows that it is not simply the existence of security measures (such as 
trespass orders) that demonstrate the goals they serve, but how they are used. While there existed 
a measure that could help to protect S4, according to her it was not used in part to avoid a 
potential lawsuit from the perpetrator, and resultant bad press. With the corporatization of 
universities, negative publicity can affect the ‘branding’ that is becoming crucial, thus 
prioritizing institutional risk management over physical security.  
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 Many of the students who discussed the university’s emphasis on budgetary matters 
worked as student-employees in various capacities, or had done volunteer work for the 
institution. As students, many of these participants viewed the security measures as lacking. 
When they became student-employees, they noted the importance placed on money rather than 
the student experience of security.  The shift generally came not from a negative experience, but 
simply having more information to glean what the university’s priorities were from their 
perspective. S1 noted that her job created a dissonance in her mind between her experience as a 
student, and the things she was told to emphasize to concerned parents and students: 
As part of my job we’re supposed to be promoting campus partners so we’re supposed to 
be promoting that special constables is 24-7 and promoting the [CANUN safety] app. And 
like I feel like their attitude is that they want to take campus security as being important, 
but their actions are not showing that. So although they’re like saying ‘yes it’s a downtown 
core we have a lot of safety initiatives’ I’m not seeing that especially as a fourth year 
student. I also feel giving campus tours, parents will ask I know you’re in [City2] it used to 
be a great city and now it’s kind of a city full of poverty, so like why would I send my kid 
here? And the only real thing I have to say is special constables and [CANUN safety] app 
and the emergency pole but like again when I was a first year student I was terrified (S1, 
emphasis added). 
The measure that most exemplifies serving the two priorities of CANUN is the special 
constables. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, while the special constables do provide 
some services that increase the physical security of members of the university, the way in which 
they are bound by university policies and jurisdiction hamper their ability to fully address student 
security concerns. The special constables are also an example of how the two goals of the 
university are not always served equally. An important example of this surrounds the decision to 
switch the special constables at CANUN2 to a 24-7 shift. At CANUN1, special constables had 
been present at the university 24 hours a day for many years, but the same service was only 
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provided to the urban campus of CANUN2 in 2017, almost two decades after its’ opening. 
Administrator participant A7 explained that the shift to 24-7 special constables at CANUN2 was 
driven by the vocal student communities who wanted equal service to the main campus and 
after-hours coverage as they felt there was a need. However, the administrator noted that the 
statistics of reported incidents on campus did not support the expansion and big commitment of 
university resources. Not all participants felt that this switch was something the university did for 
the benefit of the students, but rather for the public perception. As one faculty member asked: 
But how much does money play a role? I would imagine money plays a huge role and we'll 
spend the money if we think we can number one make it a safer place, but that's butterflies 
and unicorns. We will spend the money to make sure that we can tell people that we're 
making it a better place, but they apparently didn't care enough to make it a better place for 
a long time. We didn't get 24 hour security until this year. We've been open [for 
approximately two decades], and we've had people in residence since 2002? That's 15 
years. 15 years that our students weren't good enough to be totally supported by the 
university at their own campus. That's a different level of service than students at 
[CANUN1] or students anywhere else get. And we should get the same, we should get the 
same. (F12, emphasis added). 
Multiple special constable participants acknowledged that the decision to make them 24-7 was 
based on budget, and C14 explained that their calls have gone up since the change has been 
made. Participant C14 noted that the special constables themselves have been pushing for the 
change for a long time, and they were all thankful to see it happen. Valverde (2001) notes that 
often indirectly, governance through security measures can have effects on other values in a 
system, and notes the budgetary decisions on where to spend or not spend can illustrate these 
values. This is exemplified by the shift to 24-7 coverage by the special constables. The decision 
to not spend money providing the service at CANUN2 showed that the budgetary advantages 
was valued higher than physical security, until the opposition to this decision became too loud.   
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Invisible measures can serve both goals at CANUN2 as well. The university stresses 
BIT’s contribution to the physical safety of students, which serves two purposes - a reduction in 
harm serves the goal of keeping people safe, but it also serves the process of corporatization as a 
way to avoid liabilities. While objectively there appears to be a demonstrated interest in reducing 
harms to students, it is focused on harms the university finds most threatening (self-harm and 
large-scale incidents), rather than what the students view as the greatest source of risk (the local 
community). Therefore, while BIT focuses on the risks that some students pose to themselves 
and others, it is also a form of institutional risk management.   
As many of these quotes have evidenced, CANUN2’s use of visible and invisible 
techniques reflects the dual logics of physical security and university corporatization, and thus 
the project has multiple, often competing, priorities. While student safety is a priority, it is not 
necessarily the only one, or the most important one. Even when security measures are 
implemented with the explanation that it is not statistically necessary but will make students feel 
safer, there can be other agendas underlying those decisions. The ability to market a university as 
a ‘safe’ environment is often necessary as many parents and incoming students demand it, and 
previous tragedies on campuses have led to an overall shift towards a securitized climate. 
Reflecting on how and why techniques are used, demonstrates CANUN’s dual goals of safety of 
students, and their own self-interest.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
Schneier (2003) notes that “personal security policies are more driven by societal norms 
than by law. Business security policies are a result of a company’s self-interest” (p. 35). In many 
ways, a university is compelled to address both sides of this duality. They are beholden to 
provide physical security to their students and staff, while also taking action to minimize 
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institutional risks and remain marketable. In this way, their simultaneous goals reflect the duality 
of a university’s existence: although they are providing a service, they are also concerned with 
remaining functional and prestigious. Even the goal of physical security itself is a double-edged 
sword. While there are many at the university who sincerely want to make student’s physically 
safe, they also care about the impact any injuries that would have on their reputation, and thus 
their recruitment rates. The importance of recruitment under corporatization versus physical 
security is reflected in the way security measures are highlighted during campus tours, despite 
the institutional barriers placed on the special constables (discussed in the previous chapter) and 
the fact that the emergency pole has never been used in an emergency.  Similarly, students giving 
tours are not to draw on personal experiences that may provide potential students with a more 
accurate perception of the lived experiences of security and not the ones the university would 
like to present.  
Gregory (2012) argues that the relationship between branding and securitization of 
university is close, and it is due in large part to the importance that potential applicants place on 
a university’s supposed ‘safe’ environment. Additionally, she connects branding to potential 
liability if a campus is not properly securitized, arguing that: “…university administrators must 
validate people’s experiences and fears of campus violence, and circumvent accusations that the 
university administration is in any way responsible for such acts (Gregory, 2012, p. 72).” As 
Schneier (2003) points out, playing to the public’s demand for feeling safer when there is no 
actual threat can be beneficial, both for the public peace of mind and financially for the 
institution. With universities facing pressure to become more securitized in the wake of 
recruitment challenges and tragedies at other campuses, the outward appearance of a plethora of 
measures that are not often used may be enough to dissuade fears. Thus, while security theater 
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may be a facet of securitization in many types of institutions, it has particular importance for 
universities. This is due to the aforementioned social norms (such as the general push for safer 
campuses) they are existing in, and its relationship to the corporatization of universities. 
The link between this concept and the influence of corporatization lies in the perceptual 
advantages that security theater can bring. In fact, Schneier (2003) does not argue that security 
theater is always bad but sometimes organizations have to appear to be doing something about a 
problem, even if the actual threat is minimal. What Schneier (2003) suggests in examining what 
purpose security measures fill, is reminiscent of Valverde’s (2001; 2011b) connection between 
the techniques and the logic of a security project. Valverde describes the techniques of measures 
used in a project as being a source of discovery around what the goals or priorities of a project 
may be. For Schneier (2003), this discovery lies in examining whether security measures serve 
the purpose of actual security, or security theater; through this, information can be gleaned about 
what logics are present within a project. For example, if all techniques used are examples of 
security theater and serve no actual security purpose, that may demonstrate that the goal of 
physical security is not a high priority.  
With the attention paid to security at universities following the Virginia Tech shooting 
(Fox and Savage, 2009; Bosselait, 2010; Randazzo and Cameron, 2012), Fox and Savage (2009) 
warned against the unbridled adoption of proposed policies, as in a climate of fear the policies 
generated may not be as productive as necessary. Similarly, Schafer, Lee, Burruss and Giblin 
(2016) note that many of the policies have come in the forms of formal social control, rather than 
based on consultation with student needs. They note that these policies can be adopted for 
appearances, rather than because they are based in empirical evidence that they are effective 
(Schafer et al., 2016). Considering the absence of evaluative tools or iterative improvements at 
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CANUN, it seems that the employment of security measures is largely ritual and intended to 
inform a sense of safety. While that may not necessarily be a bad thing, the students are still 
experiencing a perceived level of insecurity that they believe is not being correctly targeted by 
many of the current measures. Returning to Valverde’s (2001) discussion of techniques of a 
security project, the lack of evaluative tools may reflect the logic, or underlying assumptions 
inherent in the project. Specifically, it raises the question of how the goals of a project can be 
contained to increasing physical security, if there are no methods to determine whether physical 
security is being changed at all? If their effectiveness on actual security is not monitored, it could 
be that their mere presence is enough, as the existence of the measures is reflective of the goals 
under corporatization.  
Overall, it is clear from examining its techniques that CANUN operates with multiple 
goals and priorities, both from physical security and corporatization perspectives. Some visible 
security measures appear to be important only from a reputational or optics perspective and 
contain elements of security theater, but the contrast with invisible measures is stark. If it is only 
a ‘scary name’ that is stopping them from expanding the awareness to the student body, why not 
change the name? Or could it be that the measure itself reflects the sometimes ‘scary’ security 
needs of a university, that CANUN would prefer students not focus on? While the focus of this 
chapter has been on the logic of the university, it appears that there are also underlying 
assumptions underscoring student experience in that there are two sides to the climate of 
securitization existing on campuses; students want to feel they are protected from threats, but 
also do not want to have their freedoms or rights infringed on. In that way, it appears the 
university is not the only body with competing interests. 
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Chapter Six: Discussion and Conclusion 
 Security on post-secondary campuses is increasingly becoming a hot-button issue, as the 
call for increased measures often follows major, tragic incidents on campus, such as the Virginia 
Tech Shooting. While a greater number of these incidents occur in the United States, Canada is 
not immune to them as evidenced by the Dawson College attack in 2006 and the shooting at 
École Polytechnique in 1989. In addition to the need for universities to prevent this type of 
incident, there is pressure to provide a ‘safe’ environment in order to recruit incoming students 
and keep the university functioning effectively (Gregory, 2012). This research raised a number 
of key questions regarding the jurisdiction of campus police in Canada, as well as potential 
resultant effects on reporting likelihood, definitions of campus space, and perceived legitimacy 
of campus police. This research also questioned the underlying assumptions of a university that 
guide their decision making around security, and noted that the goals may not always be as 
stated. In the following sections, I will further detail how the security projects framework was 
reflected in my findings, and how this research has contributed towards the framework’s 
understanding. I will then provide further explanation of the significance of jurisdiction on post-
secondary campuses, and connect it with the subject of reporting of victimization. In the 
subsequent section, I will outline how the techniques used for security at a university may shed 
light on their realized priorities, and what the techniques’ visibility or lack thereof may 
demonstrate. Lastly, I will outline the limitations of this research, and provide suggestions for 
further research to build off of these foundations. 
Security Projects Framework 
At the onset of this research, Valverde’s (2001; 2008; 2009; 2011a; 2011b; 2014) security 
projects framework was used to shape the research questions and the interview guides. Instead of 
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focusing on whether security is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ on campus, I assessed the campus as a security 
project in order to adhere to Valverde’s suggestions. This entailed examining the systems and 
processes that claim to contribute to ‘security’, and may include both visible and non-visible 
policies and measures. Valverde (2011b) proposed three major components of a security project, 
which are the logic, the scope and the techniques. In the following paragraphs I will discuss how 
these three components were reflected upon.  
In this research, the logic of a security project and the techniques of a project became 
inextricably linked. Valverde (2011b) acknowledged that the best way to study the logic of a 
project was through its techniques. The present study offers a substantive contribution to this 
framework, as it provided a practical application of this method from a security perspective. In 
the past applications of this manner have been conducted, but from a legal perspective (see 
Lippert and Walby, 2014). Valverde (2011b) stressed the importance of considering security 
techniques within the context they occur in, rather than on their own. For example, the 
emergency pole was pointed to frequently during marketing of the institution but had never been 
used, demonstrating its contribution to corporatization rather than risk management. If the 
technique was considered separately from the goals of the project, this would not have been 
readily apparent. Additionally, the lack of defined evaluations for any security measure 
emphasizes the low importance placed on actual effectiveness. The dual interests of the 
university are reflective of their competing goals as both an educational institution and a 
corporatized entity.  
The scope of a project often includes the temporal and spatial scales of its measures, and 
the jurisdictional definitions under which it operates. While many measures did not operate on a 
limited temporal scale (and were instead in place 24 hours a day), the campus police had recently 
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undergone a major shift in their temporality (from partial to 24/7 coverage) that had already been 
in place for many years at the main campus. In the original service, it appeared that the 
university felt the special constables were not needed enough at night to justify the cost of 
extending their shifts. However, the special constables themselves, the students and multiple 
faculty members had been vocal about the need for 24-hour coverage. Valverde (2011a) notes 
that the temporal scale chosen can represent political rationalities. In this case, it appears that 
regardless of whether there was a demonstrated need on campus for more coverage (as evidenced 
by the reported spike in calls since coverage was increased), it was not changed until the need 
could be justified from a public image perspective. Once the voices asking for it became too loud 
to ignore, the change occurred. Adding to the public image benefit, the university was quick to 
use the 24/7 coverage as a selling feature on its recruitment tours.  
This study contributes significantly to this framework by demonstrating the practical 
importance of spatial and jurisdictional boundaries. As discussed in Chapter Four, the way that 
the governing body (CANUN2) defined campus ‘space’ and thus the jurisdiction of the special 
constables, was a source of great discontent with the student participants. This study contributes 
to the framework by exemplifying the need for the examination of perceived spatial scales by 
those who use the institution, rather than only the spatial boundaries as defined by the institution 
itself. While Valverde (2011) includes land use, urban planning and zoning as ways to examine 
the spatiality of a security project (which have particular importance during urban renewal 
efforts), it is also important to examine where these definitions differ from those who are part of 
the institution but not its decision-makers. For CANUN2, these spatial definitions underscored 
the difference between the realized jurisdiction of the special constables, and the students’ 
expected jurisdiction.  
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Valverde (2014) emphasized the importance of jurisdiction in defining how governance 
occurs, instead of just where. This importance is evidenced in the present study, particularly in 
regards to how the special constables balance the separate bodies that govern them (the 
municipal police and the university). While they are paid by the university, they are mandated by 
the municipal police and subject to restrictions placed on them by both powers. This is a 
blending of public and private domain, where a public police force is given power at a private 
institution. For example, the special constables are required by the municipal police to hand over 
cases that are serious in nature. However, in many instances special constables reported having 
options that they would not as municipal officers. They can engage in a sort of harm reduction, 
where instead of entering students into the criminal justice system, they can connect them with 
supports at the university for addictions counselling, mental health and wellness supports, and 
financial assistance. In this way, how they are able to govern differs from how the municipal 
police are able to when they respond to calls within the same area.  While Valverde (2008) 
speaks of jurisdiction from a theoretical perspective, by examining the way jurisdiction is 
implemented in circumstances that contain many challenges to its seamless definition, this study 
contributes to understandings of jurisdiction in a practical sense. With this information, post-
secondary campuses, particularly urban ones, can reflect on their own jurisdictional boundaries 
and how they may connect or not connect with students’ understandings of campus space. They 
may also take a critical look at the negative interactions with campus police reported by students, 
and evaluate how many of them stem from confusion over boundaries. 
Jurisdiction of Campus Police 
 This study contributes to the broader understanding of the complicated jurisdictional 
issues that often face campus police. Campuses in North America have been using their own 
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police services since 1894 (Paoline and Sloan, 2002; Patten, Alward and Thomas, 2016), yet they 
are an understudied type of police service. This is of special importance for Canadian institutions 
that use special constables, as they are mandated by municipal police services that may have 
differing goals and policies than universities, while often existing in the same areas. For campus 
police and private security officers at mass properties, their jurisdictions often overlap with other 
public police agencies on a municipal, provincial or federal level (Rigakos and Greener, 2000). 
As Shearing and Stenning (1983) noted, these mass properties and the private security often 
present on them have been steadily increasing over the last 60 years. This research improves the 
understanding of many intricacies of how jurisdictional overlaps are negotiated and raises 
questions about the impact of this overlap on the perceived legitimacy of police and security 
services, particularly in the context of urban renewal and the corresponding social tensions that 
such efforts can engender.  
Hopkins and Neff (2014) note varying campus police jurisdictions as either limited, or 
extended. Extended jurisdictions range beyond the university campus, often to specific buildings 
where students live or frequent, or in a specified distance outward. Campus police may 
technically be granted jurisdiction for the whole municipality or state as sworn officers (as seen 
at Yale University), but hold agreements to only exercise their powers in designated areas 
(Hopkins and Neff, 2014; Jacobsen, 1995). Jacobsen (1995) also argues for extended 
jurisdictions, or what he terms university-precinct jurisdiction, and he presents a model statute 
that would help define it in legislation. The default of such an option would be university 
property plus 500 yards of jurisdiction outside of it, with the option to create agreements with 
municipal police to extend or tighten that size (Jacobsen, 1995). This study presented evidence 
that the current ‘limited’ (Jacobsen, 1995) model at CANUN2, may not be suited for urban 
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campuses and that it may be time to consider a ‘university-precinct’ model, where campus police 
have specialized jurisdiction over an entire area rather than on university property only.   
  CANUN2 exemplified many of the intricacies that can come with balancing the 
relationships between the municipal police service and the university, and demonstrated how an 
urban campus presents particular jurisdictional challenges compared to ‘closed’ campuses. At 
CANUN2, the definition of campus space by students does not follow the university’s 
boundaries, and the resultant confusion often leads to negative interactions with the special 
constables. Without a formal understanding of the way the special constables are mandated, 
students end up placing blame for these interactions on the special constables, negatively 
impacting their perceived legitimacy amongst students. While previous studies have noted 
jurisdictional challenges faced by campus police (Jacobsen, 1995; Peathe et al., 2008; Hopkins 
and Neff, 2014), this study uniquely connected these jurisdictional challenges with negative 
interactions with students. Additionally, while previous research has noted the impact of student-
campus police interactions on the perceived legitimacy of campus police (Aiello and Lawton, 
2018; Patton et al., 2016), this study uniquely connected jurisdictional issues to these interactions 
and perceived legitimacy through the examination of students’ lived experiences.  
Reported Victimization at Post-Secondary Campuses 
 This study also makes theoretical contributions to the subject of the reliability of 
victimization statistics on campuses. While the ‘dark figure of crime’, where many crimes go 
unreported, is well documented (Biderman and Reiss, 1967; Skogan, 1977; Macdonald, 2001), 
this study raises some questions about how interactions with campus police may affect this. 
Patton et al. (2016) argue that the dissolution of police legitimacy can cause negative interactions 
between the police and citizens, and Aiello and Lawton (2018) found that perceived legitimacy is 
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directly related to reporting likelihood. With the findings of the present study, it is important to 
consider the cycle of the process in its entirety. The fact that students were having negative 
interactions with the special constables, and often turned to not reporting incidents, or simply 
reporting them to the municipal police instead, means that the university may not be capturing 
reported victimizations in addition to unreported ones. 
This is of particular importance in the context of the attempt by many universities to 
brand themselves as ‘safe’ in the emerging campus climate of security. Fisher et al. (2002) 
acknowledged that the Clery Act (where universities in the United States must report incidents of 
victimization on campus) does little to prevent crime, and is not regulated well enough that many 
crimes may be not counted. They further connect the advantage of institutions missing or 
misrepresenting victimization data to the push for universities to appear safer than other 
comparable institutions in order to recruit applicants.  
 Lastly, the jurisdiction of urban campuses can also allow universities to represent 
themselves as more statistically safe, due to the way they define on-campus crime. For example, 
if a student is victimized on the sidewalk of the library on a closed campus, this very well may be 
on university property and thus is counted towards on-campus crime. However, at an urban-
campus, the same situation may be considered to be on city property, as it would be at CANUN2, 
and instead is counted towards the city’s crime rate only.  
Corporatization of Universities 
During the course of the research, by examining how and why various visible and 
invisible techniques were used, it became clear that security measures were serving the goal of 
more than just physical security. Based on participants’ experiences, it appeared that there was 
also simultaneous goals that were being serviced due to the effects of corporatization. Along 
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with physical security, the security measures provided benefits for marketing purposes, and for 
institutional risk management priorities (as defined by Rothstein, 2006) such as avoiding 
lawsuits and protecting the university’s brand. The pressure to provide a perceptually ‘safe’ 
environment to maintain high recruitment numbers has added the necessity of security measures 
being marketable on campus recruitment tours. However, this means that some measures may be 
being utilized for their visibility and the feeling of safety that provides, rather than their 
contribution to physical security, similar to Schneier’s (2003) concept of security theater. This 
study contributed to the field of corporatization of academia by demonstrating the benefit of 
examining the way security measures are used, rather than only which measures exist. This is 
best illustrated by the shift to a 24-7 schedule by the CANUN2 special constables. Noting this 
shift in scope, and the reasons for the change, revealed the competing interests of the university. 
The change occurred when it became in the university’s best interest rather than when it only 
served the goal of student safety. 
The information gleaned from this method was also illustrative with the behavioural 
intervention team (BIT). Noting that the measure was covert revealed a lot about its purpose. 
While administrator participants acknowledged they are not yet marketing BIT due to its ‘scary 
name’, if that is the only obstacle, why not change the name? The answer likely lies in that the 
‘scary name’ alludes to the fact that the inward-facing nature of the measure may be what is 
actually problematic to students. The students are afraid of threats from the outside, whereas the 
university is protecting against threats from the inside, often by looking at the students 
themselves. In the effort to create a perceptually ‘safe’ environment, the university may not want 
to raise the notion that their measures are there to also target the student on the recruitment tour, 
not just protect them.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
 Despite the contributions of this study, there are a small number of limitations that exist, 
particularly in regards to its generalizability. The sample size for this study (N=18) is not large, 
with only 3 campus police officers. Additionally, while the student experiences were diverse and 
often unique, there were more female participants than male. The experiences gathered by 
participants who were willing to participate is not always generalizable to the experiences of 
those who have not; mainly due to the fact that participants may have experienced an event they 
would like to discuss, whereas non-participants may have had no interactions with the security 
measures at all. Future studies of this nature should attempt to include a higher number of 
participants overall, with greater representation of male students and more campus police 
officers as well. However, I acknowledge that the limited number of campus police officers in 
general constrained my ability to gather interviews, in addition to the overall reluctance to 
participate.  
 The inclusion of only one institution and one campus may also limit the study’s findings. 
Due to time and resource constraints, a comparative approach using an urban campus and a 
‘closed’ campus at one university was unachievable, but future research should definitely 
consider expanding to that approach. Comparing multiple institutions would also likely provide 
interesting data, particularly if the institutions used differing jurisdiction models for their campus 
police. Additionally, much of the data was collected within a time span of 3 months, so while 
administrators could refer to policies they intended on creating, it was impossible to assess how 
they were actually going to be used and experienced. A longer timeframe would allow the 
tracking of a new policy from its infantile stages to its implementation, and may provide more 
direct data about what influences the creation of security measures.  
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 Future research would be well served by considering a number of methodological 
options. For example, a mixed-methods approach, using interviews and surveys may be 
beneficial. In the first part, semi-structured interviews could be used to garner information about 
relationships with campus police, perceived legitimacy and definitions of concepts such as space 
and security. These could then be used to inform a large survey of students to get a wider picture 
without the need for an unachievable amount of resources. The ability to reach more students 
may have provided more information about students who did not respond to initial recruitment 
materials due to the time commitments of an interview. Additionally, if reluctance on behalf of 
the campus police were to be experienced in future studies, a ride-along with the campus police 
may provide observable information about how they are interacting with students, other security 
measures, and any challenges they may face.  
 From a theoretical perspective, there are a number of questions raised by my study that 
should be addressed in future research. First, the question of how a university balances its 
business priorities with that of the safety of the students should be further explored. While this 
study provides indicators with budgetary restrictions and anecdotal evidence, more information 
about how a university makes these decisions would be beneficial. Second, over the course of 
this research, it became apparent that CANUN2 engaged in multiple harm reduction approaches 
within their security measures, similar to diversion methods. Administrators and special 
constables often recalled connecting students with support services rather than the criminal 
justice system, and noted they often use the behavioural intervention team to do this. It would be 
worth exploring how students end up being selected for these measures, and how they serve the 
priorities of a university. Lastly, the question of what jurisdictional model is most effective on an 
urban campus needs to be addressed. This study illuminated some serious potential flaws with 
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the ‘limited’ model (Jacobsen, 1995). Further research could include a university that was 
willing to engage in a trial of a different, more expansive method, particularly through the 
creation of Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with the municipal police services. If not 
possible, a comparative study between post-secondary campuses that have varying models would 
provide an excellent next step from this research.  
 Universities are a place where a considerable number of youth mature, grow and flourish. 
They are also considered pillars of freedom of thought and expression that are often on the 
progressive side of social change. However, with increased focus on their security measures 
from the media, potential applicants, and their families, it is important to continually assess that 
they may be exemplifying social change in a different way: the proliferation of a security climate 
designed more for optics and market relations than for effective improvement of ‘actual 
security’. Additionally, this change in priorities may leave students who are experiencing 
insecurity on a campus with nowhere to turn, especially at campuses where the jurisdiction of the 
campus police may not align with the unique challenges of their campus. In an increasingly 
surveilled society, the changes following dramatic tragedies such as the Virginia Tech shooting 
echo those prevalent post-9-11. As evidenced by the changes post-911 (e.g. the revelations 
exposed by Edward Snowden), this can be a slippery slope. Universities often engage in critical 
work at many industries, governments and agencies. However, to protect the principles of what a 
university symbolizes, it is crucial to remember to turn the critical gaze inward, especially at the 
security cameras doing the same.   
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Informed Consent Form 
Securitizing Schooling: Post-Secondary Campuses as Security Projects 
 
Letter of Information /Consent for INTERVIEWS (REB#5469) 
 
Principle Investigator: 
Andrea Corradi  
MA Candidate, Criminology, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences  
Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford 73 George St. Brantford, ON, N3T 2Y3  
corr9470@mylaurier.ca 
 
Research Supervisors: 
Dr. Carrie B. Sanders 
Associate Professor, Criminology, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences 
Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford 73 George St. 
Brantford, ON, N3T 2Y3 519-756-8228 ext. 5870 csanders@wlu.ca  
 
Dr. James Popham 
Associate Professor, Criminology, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences 
Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford 73 George St. 
Brantford, ON, N3T 2Y3 519-756-8228 ext. 5631 jpopham@wlu.ca  
 
Research Objectives 
The objectives of this Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada funded 
project are to examine the perceived use and effectiveness of a security project on a Canadian 
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university campus. This will be accomplished through a document analysis and interviews with 
administrators, campus officers and students. In order to advance the state of scholarship on 
campus security, the proposed project adopts a security projects framework (Valverde, 2001) to 
understand the perceptions of safety and security on post-secondary campuses. Vital to 
Valverde’s (2001; 2011; 2014) security projects framework is the questioning of the underlying 
assumptions of a project, which are often seen in the lived experiences of them. This study 
seeks to understand (i) what are the similarities and differences between students’, faculty’s, 
campus security officers’ and university administrators’ definitions and perceptions of security? 
(ii) What are the perceived objectives of the use of security measures, and what are the 
intended and unintended consequences of the security projects? (iii) How do the findings 
reflect or not reflect the security projects framework? 
 
Procedures involved in the Research  
We would like you to participate in an in‐depth interview, either face‐to-face or over the 
telephone, at a place and time convenient to you. With your consent the interview will be audio 
recorded for transcriptions and analysis by the principal investigator. The interview will last 
approximately one hour. We will invite your open-ended responses to several questions about 
your work practices and lived experiences. We may contact you a second time with follow‐up 
questions or with questions of clarification. You may, at your choosing, review the transcript of 
your interview.  
 
Potential Harms, Risks or Discomforts:  
There are no physical risks to participation in this study. While we will keep your identity and 
information confidential because of the close knit community on campus there is a minimal risk 
that informed observers might surmise your identity or involvement from our publications. This 
could have negative peer or professional consequences. Throughout the study, your 
information will remain anonymous, all identifying material will be kept separate from your 
data, and will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in Dr. Sanders’ office, with data stored on a 
password protected computer accessible only to Andrea Corradi and her research supervisors. 
All data and identifying data will be kept for five years after completion of the study (i.e, data 
collection) and will then be destroyed.  
 
Potential Benefits  
This study is unlikely to provide direct benefit to you however, it will benefit the research 
community by shedding light on the climate of security on a post-secondary campus in the 
Canadian context, and will work to uncover information about the lived experiences of security 
measures. The security measures used on campuses affect a large number of people, and 
similar measures are used in alternative contexts. This would benefit not only those who 
interact with post-secondary campuses but all of us who engage (knowingly or unknowingly) 
with security measures on a daily basis. 
 
Confidentiality:  
Interview data will be audio taped and transcribed for later analysis by myself. You can opt out 
of having the interview audio-recorded, and instead I will take notes by hand during the 
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interview. You should know that if you agree to participate in this interview, you are not 
required to answer the questions if you do not want to, and you can end the interview at any 
time. If you decide to withdraw from the study at the end of the interview or at a later date, 
you can choose to have your responses destroyed to that point if you wish. I am assigning a 
number to this interview rather than your name, and all your answers will be held in strict 
confidence. This consent form will be kept separate from the data set and destroyed at the end 
of the study. Your audio recorded responses will also be assigned a number and will not be 
identifiable in any results presented. These tapes will be kept secure in a locked cabinet. The 
tape itself will be erased when the study is through. If you choose to withdraw from the study 
you can choose to have your tape-‐ recorded interview destroyed if you wish. Anonymity will be 
maintained for research subjects through anonymous quotation in the final report and in all 
presentations and publications, unless consent to reveal identity has been given.  
 
Participation:  
Participation in this research study is entirely voluntary. You are free to withdraw at any time 
and without prejudice. If you decide to withdraw before the interview is conducted, the 
interview will be canceled. If you withdraw during the interview, the interview will stop and the 
recording will be destroyed. If you decide to withdraw after the interview, but before the final 
study report is written, you may contact me to do so. All your data will then be destroyed 
unless you specify otherwise. You will receive a copy of this consent form for your records.  
 
Rights of Research Participants: 
If you have questions or require more information about the study itself, please contact me, 
Andrea Corradi, by phone 416-910-4982, or corr9470@mylaurier.ca  
 
This study has been reviewed and approved by Wilfrid Laurier University’s Research Ethics 
Board. If you have concerns or questions about your rights as a participant or about the way the 
study is conducted, you may contact:  
Dr. R. Basso, Chair, University Research Ethics Board, Wilfrid Laurier University Research (519) 
884‐1970 ext. 4994 rbasso@wlu.ca  
 
INTERVIEW CONSENT  
Consent and Privacy Options  YES  
 
NO 
  
 
1. I understand and agree to participate in the research, I am willing to participate in 
an in-person or telephone interview to be scheduled/conducted at my convenience.  
 
  
2. I agree to the interview being tape-recorded  
 
  
3. I would like to review the transcript of the interview.  
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4. I am willing to allow the researchers to cite information offered in my interview 
(cited anonymously, not ascribed directly to me).  
 
  
5. I would like to receive a copy of the final report when it is published.  
 
 
 
 
6. 6. I would agree to be re-contacted if necessary.  
 
  
 
I have read the foregoing information, or it has been read to me, and I have been provided with 
a copy of the interview question guideline.  I have had the opportunity to ask questions about it 
and any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction.   I consent 
voluntarily to participate as a participant in this research.   
I understand that I may withdraw from participation at any point without consequence.  I also 
understand that I may decline to answer any questions that are asked of me by the researcher.  
I acknowledge that if during the course of my participation in this research engagement I 
commit or disclose any illegal acts that I have committed, the researcher is under a legal 
obligation to report my actions. 
I will keep a signed copy of this consent form and provide a signed copy to the researcher for 
their records.  
 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions about my involvement in this study, and to receive 
any additional details I wanted to know about the study. I understand that I may withdraw from 
the study at any time, if I choose to do so, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been 
given a copy of this form.  
 
_________________________________________________  
 _____________________________  
Name of Participant       Date  
 
_______________________________________________________  
Signature of Participant  
 
 
If you would like to receive copies of research findings please provide an email address that 
these findings can be sent to: 
 
 
 
In my opinion, the person who has signed above is agreeing to participate in this study 
voluntarily, and understands the nature of the study and the consequences of participation in 
it.  
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______________________________________ Signature of Researcher or Witness  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Recruitment Letter 
Securitizing Schooling: Post-Secondary Campuses as Security Projects 
 
Recruitment Email (REB#5469) 
 
University campuses are synonymous with learning, youth, freedom and expression, 
however in recent times they have also become associated with a series of tragic events. 
Infamous shootings at Virginia Tech, Northern Arizona University, the University of Texas 
and many others have endured highly sensational coverage, bringing the topic of 
securitization of post-secondary campuses throughout North America to the forefront of 
countless minds. There exists a need for an in-depth look at the climate of security on a 
campus, and how it is experienced by those designing security measures, those enforcing 
them, and the students being protected by them. This need is particularly stark on 
Canadian campuses, where little research has been on the subject. 
 
The goal of this Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada funded project 
is to examine the perceived use and effectiveness of a security project on a Canadian 
university campus. This will be accomplished through a document analysis and interviews 
with administrators, campus officers and students. In order to advance the state of 
scholarship on campus security, the proposed project adopts a security projects framework 
(Valverde, 2001) to understand the perceptions of safety and security on post-secondary 
campuses. Vital to Valverde’s (2001; 2011; 2014) security projects framework is the 
questioning of the underlying assumptions of a project, which are often seen in the lived 
experiences of them. This study seeks to understand (i) what are the similarities and 
differences between students’, faculty’s, campus security officers’ and university 
administrators’ definitions and perceptions of security? (ii) What are the perceived 
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objectives of the use of security measures, and what are the intended and unintended 
consequences of the security projects? (iii) How do the findings reflect or not reflect the 
security projects framework? 
 
To acquire an in-depth understanding of how security measures are created, implemented 
and experienced, we would like you to participate in an in‐depth interview, either 
face‐to-face or over the telephone, at a place and time convenient to you. From these 
interviews we hope to identify how security policies align with or differ from everyday 
needs and lived experiences of them, as well as the motivations behind their creation and 
implementation. This study had received approval by the Research Ethics Board 
(REB#5469) 
 
If you are interested in participating in this important research project, or wish to hear 
more about the study, please contact the principal investigator Andrea Corradi, by email at 
corr9470@mylaurier.ca through your personal email rather than work email to 
maintain anonymity or by phone at 416-910-4982.  
 
Potential Benefits  
This study is unlikely to provide direct benefit to you however, it will benefit the research 
community by shedding light on the climate of security on a post-secondary campus in the 
Canadian context, and will work to uncover information about the lived experiences of 
security measures. The security measures used on campuses affect a large number of 
people, and similar measures are used in alternative contexts. This would benefit not only 
those who interact with post-secondary campuses but all of us who engage (knowingly or 
unknowingly) with security measures on a daily basis. 
 
  
Thank you, 
 
Andrea Corradi 
MA Candidate, Criminology, Faculty of Human and Social Sciences  
Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford 73 George St. Brantford, ON, N3T 2Y3  
corr9470@mylaurier.ca 
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Appendix C: Recruitment Poster 
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Appendix D: Interview Guide Administrator 
Administrators  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. I am interviewing participants in various 
positions on campus about their experiences with security measures on campus and your 
contribution is greatly appreciated.  
I will start by asking you a few questions about how long you have worked at the school, and 
then I will move into questions about how you define and perceive security on campus. It will be 
about your personal opinions and experiences in your role. 
Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
Information  
Let’s start with some questions about your relationship to [the university]. 
1. How long have you been an administrator at [the university]? 
2. Are you from City 2 originally, or did you move here for school/your job? 
3. What is your relationship to decision-making processes for security policies on campus? 
a. What is the decision-making process for prioritizing security measures on campus? 
b. Do administrators go through any of the training for certain policies themselves when 
they are being implemented? E.g. receive same training as threat assessment teams 
 
Defining and Perceiving Security 
I am interested in understanding security on university campuses. As such, I am interested in 
understanding how people define and perceive security. For this first section of questions I 
would like you to think about your understandings of and experiences with security here in City2.  
4. Can you please tell me what security on campus means to you? 
a. What are some examples of security that you’ve noticed here in City2? 
5. How would you rate the level of security on the [the university] campus? 
a. Are there any areas where campus security could be improved in your opinion? 
b. How do the actions of the special constables influence the level of security?  
c. Should special constables have discretionary power over the application of policies?  
6. What does a threat on campus mean to you? 
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a. Does your opinion differ from the approach that the university generally takes regarding 
threats to security? 
b. In your opinion, what do you think the biggest threat on campus is? 
7. How does the university respond to violent incidents that occur at other universities? 
a. Do security measures change? 
 
Perceived Objectives 
For the next few questions I will be inquiring about what you think the goals of security on 
campus are, and how the university prioritizes these goals. 
8. What changes to campus security measures/technologies while you have been at [the university] 
are you aware of? 
a. In your opinion, what were the driving forces for their implementation? 
b. How well have they met their stated goals/purposes? 
c. How were the measures purposes defined? How is their success measured? Who defines 
their success? 
9. What kind of security issues command the most priority? 
d. What influences their prioritization? 
e. How is the priority determined? 
f. What kind of drills or scenarios are run on campus in preparation? 
 
Consequences (Unintended and Intended) of Security Measures 
We are also looking at the intended and unintended consequences of security measures. The next 
few questions will relate to how various measures are interacted with and explore some of these 
consequences. 
10. What is the nature of the relationship between municipal, provincial or federal police services and 
the university? 
a. What can you tell me about the nature of this relationship? 
b. How do they provide input on policies? 
c. What sort of jurisdictional issues affect this relationship? 
11. Does the process to create policies factor in the potential to exacerbate fears? 
d. Do they take steps to minimize fears? E.g. being unnecessarily covert 
e. How might this be influences by the special constables’ actions? 
12. What qualifies a student for investigation by the behavioural intervention team? 
f. Are these records open to students? 
g. Is this measure advertised or covert? 
h. Who decides who sits on the team? 
i. What powers do the team have? 
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Appendix E: Interview Guide Special Constable 
Campus Police 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. I am interviewing participants in various 
positions on campus about their experiences with security measures on campus and your 
contribution is greatly appreciated.  
I will start by asking you a few questions about how long you have worked at the school, and 
then I will move into questions about how you define and perceive security on campus. It will be 
about your personal opinions and experiences in your role. 
Do you have any questions before we begin? 
 
Information  
Let’s start with some questions about your relationship to [the university]. 
1. How long have you been a Special Constable at [the university]? 
a. Have you worked at any other post-secondary institutions? If so, what sort of campus 
were they? (e.g. urban, closed, big or small…) 
b. What is your background as a security professional? 
2. Are you from City2 originally, or did you move here for school/your job? 
3. What is the decision-making process for prioritizing security measures on campus? 
4. What kind of training have you received through the university? 
a. What kind of training have you had with the [municipal] police?  
b. What was covered? 
c. What kind of training has been provided for you outside of the university? 
 
Defining and Perceiving Security 
I am interested in understanding security on university campuses. As such, I am interested in 
understanding how people define and perceive security. For this section of questions I would like 
you to think about your understandings of and experiences with security here in Brantford.  
5. Can you please tell me what security on campus means to you? 
a. What are some examples of security measures that you participated in here in City2? 
6. How would you rate the level of security on the [the university] campus? 
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b. Are there any areas where campus security could be improved in your opinion? 
7. How do you feel your presence on campus is viewed by students and faculty? 
c. By administrators of the university? 
8. What does a threat on campus mean to you? 
d. Does your opinion differ from the approach that the university generally takes regarding 
threats to security? 
e. In your opinion, what do you think the biggest threat on campus is? 
f. How does the policy to deal with that align with how you think it should be dealt with? 
 
Perceived Objectives 
For the next few questions I will be inquiring about what you think the goals of security on 
campus are, and how the university prioritizes these goals. 
9. What security measures/technologies on campus do you think are the most effective? 
a. In your opinion, what were the driving forces for their implementation? 
b. How were the measures purposes defined? How is their success measured? Who defines 
their success? 
10. What kind of security issues command the most priority? 
c. How is the priority determined? 
d. What role does public pressure play? 
11. What security measures are you typically responsible for implementing? 
e. How are these security measures evaluated in terms of effectiveness? (i.e. what is the 
standard of success?) 
12. What, if any, security measures would you recommend that are not in place? 
 
Consequences (Unintended and Intended) of Security Measures 
We are also looking at the intended and unintended consequences of security measures. The next 
few questions will relate to how various measures are interacted with and explore some of these 
consequences. 
13. Can you describe how jurisdiction is negotiated between the city police and special constables? 
a. What might contribute toward the [municipal] police taking the lead on an 
incident/investigation? 
b. How would you describe the working relationship between the police and the special 
constables? 
14. What is your role in the creation of security policies/techniques? 
c. Do you get asked for input, or are you able to make suggestions? 
d. If you disagreed with a policy, how would you handle that? 
e. If you have disagreed, were your opinions heard? 
15. Outside of a university context, police services often have who they refer to as ‘frequent flyers’, 
or people they have repeated contacts with. Is this something that happens on campus as well and 
if so, what kind of situations lead to repeated contacts?  
16. In your opinion, how do violent incidents at other institutions affect [the university]’s security 
policies and measures? 
f. Have you noticed any directly attributable policy changes? 
g. How well do you think the university does at responding to these incidents? 
h. What would you change/prefer to be changed about the way the university responds? 
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Appendix F: Interview Guide Students and Faculty 
Faculty and Students 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. I am interviewing participants in various 
positions on campus about their experiences with security measures on campus and your 
contribution is greatly appreciated.  
I will start by asking you a few questions about how long you have been at the school, and then I 
will move into questions about how you define and perceive security on campus. It will be about 
your personal opinions and interactions. 
Do you have any questions before we begin? 
Introduction 
Let’s start with some questions about your relationship to [the university] 
1. How long have you been a student/faculty member at [the university]? 
2. Are you from City2 originally, or did you move here for school/your job? 
 
Defining and Perceiving Security 
I am interested in understanding security on university campuses. As such, I am interested in 
understanding how people define and perceive security. For this first section of questions I 
would like you to think about your understandings of and experiences with security here in City2.  
3. What does security on campus mean to you? 
a. What are some examples of security that you’ve noticed here in City 2? 
4. Do you feel secure on campus? 
a. What is it that makes you feel that way? 
b. How does being in an urban centre (“downtown”) affect your perceptions of safety? 
There has been growing public attention paid to violent incidents such as sexual assaults or 
active shooter situations occurring at other post-secondary education campuses, particularly in 
Canada and the United States. For this next section I’d like you to reflect on how your 
knowledge about these incidents may affect your perception of campus security. 
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5. Are you familiar with any violent incidents that may have occurred on other campuses?  
a. How does that make you feel about security on this campus? 
b. What does a threat on campus mean to you? 
6. What do you think the biggest threat on campus is? 
a. Why do you think it’s the most threatening? 
b. Do you think it’s considered a threat/very threatening by the school? 
 
Consequences (Unintended and Intended) of Security Measures 
We are also looking at how the use of security measures may affect your daily routines and 
experiences. The next few questions will relate to how you interact with various measures and 
explore what measures you have had contact with. 
7.  What interactions have you had with the [the university] special constables to date?  
a. How did those affect your sense of security here? 
8. What jobs do you think the special constables perform on campus? 
b. What do you think their role should be? 
c. How does this compare with your experiences? 
d. What do you think should be changed about their roles to improve campus security? 
e. How does their presence compare to the presence of the [municipal] police on campus? 
9. In addition to campus security, [the university] has introduced a number of other (passive and 
active) security measures on campus. What measures are you aware of? 
f. What drew your attention to them? 
g. How do their presence make you feel about security on campus? 
h. Did you often think about these measures before our conversation today? 
10. How has campus security (including campus police and passive measures) affected your 
behaviour?  
i. In what ways do you think security measures have changed the behaviour of others? 
11. Have you ever heard of the Behavioural Intervention Team? 
 
Perceived Objectives 
For the last few questions I will be inquiring about what you think the goals of security on 
campus are, and how the university prioritizes these goals. 
12. What do you think the purpose of the security measures are? 
a. How well do you think they serve this purpose? 
13. How do you think the university decides what security measures to implement? 
b. Who do you think makes the decisions?  
c. What would you say their priorities are? 
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